Home » CND Intersessional – Session 5 – Legal, Scientific, and Regulatory Challenges in Scheduling Substances

CND Intersessional – Session 5 – Legal, Scientific, and Regulatory Challenges in Scheduling Substances

Chair: Good Morning.

Secretariat: (organizational matters + scheduling 101)

Moderator/intro: Mr. Justice Tettey, Chief, Drugs, Laboratory and Scientific Services Branch, UNODC: Good morning, dear colleagues. Thank you for this opportunity to address the question you posed about our scheduling system. First, I’d like to say that I couldn’t agree more with the previous speaker regarding the importance of being driven by science. However, I must respectfully disagree with the idea that our treaties are outdated; in our view, they don’t need replacement but rather a more flexible application. Let’s start with some history—something I know both Joe and Justice Teddy have already touched on. The development of the international scheduling process was a landmark in the evolution of the international drug control system, and it remains an extremely effective tool for achieving our shared goals. Scheduling is effective because, instead of applying a one-size-fits-all approach to all potentially dangerous substances, it allows us to use scientific evidence to find the right balance between access and safety. Balance is key here. It allows us to ensure access to controlled substances while mitigating the risks of their diversion. Importantly, scheduling also provides a shared set of controlled substances for all parties, though countries are free to go beyond these minimum requirements domestically. Now, while our system is effective, it is not perfect. It faces several key challenges—scientific, legal, and regulatory—that we as the commission must address. Why the commission? Because each of the three international drug control treaties, which cover the scheduling of substances, specifically empowers the commission to make these decisions. Although we rely on the expert advice of the World Health Organization and the International Narcotics Control Board, the commission holds this significant responsibility. And to fulfill that responsibility appropriately, the countries participating in the commission must ensure that their representatives understand the treaties, the science, and the legal implications of our decisions. Now, turning to the specific challenges you asked me to address: First, there is the lack of available data on usage and harms. Second, the process of bringing new substances under control is lengthy, often taking months or years. Third, many countries lack the national capacity to enforce balanced control measures, which can lead to either diversion or overly restrictive bans.  We also see a wide variety of approaches to domestic scheduling, with little transparency about how each country manages these controls. And lastly, there’s often a reluctance within the commission to clarify vague or ambiguous aspects of the treaties. Many of these issues stem from the rapid diversification of drugs and drug markets. When the treaties were written, global drug threats numbered in the single digits. Today, with the explosion of new substances, it’s understandable that our system is struggling to keep pace. As a lawyer, I want to focus on one key legal challenge: international scheduling is reactive rather than proactive. At best, the standard process takes several months to a year from the time a substance is identified to a vote, and even longer before countries take corresponding domestic action. While the traditional scheduling process has served us well, the treaties do contain a legal provision that could allow us to respond more quickly to emerging threats. Both the 1961 and 1971 conventions include provisions for applying provisional control to substances, although the details on how to do this are limited. Exploring this option, especially for newly emerging synthetic drugs, could help us respond more effectively to the dynamic drug markets we face today. However, we must remember that international scheduling alone is not enough. National controls can often be applied more swiftly and be more responsive to emerging threats. In the USA, for example, we have expedited procedures for emergency scheduling when an imminent public health risk is identified. These measures are temporary and must be because our judicial system requires fundamental fairness and due process. As countries adopt national control measures on substances not yet internationally scheduled, international cooperation can become more difficult, especially as control lists diverge. Creating a centralized mechanism to share information on national control lists and measures would improve cooperation and help relevant authorities keep track of each country’s regulations. Finally, as we strive to control substances quickly and effectively, we must also ensure that these measures do not hinder legitimate access to controlled substances for medical and scientific purposes. Overly stringent implementation could inadvertently lead to inaccessibility for those in need. The goal of scheduling is to categorize substances based on their potential harm and benefit, applying appropriately balanced controls to mitigate risks without compromising access to their benefits. This principle must be respected at the national level as we implement these decisions. Thank you.

Moderator: Thank you for reiterating Andres’ point about ensuring scheduling is driven by science. Your presentation emphasized the importance of flexibility within the conventions, which remains crucial. The role of CND was well noted, and I agree that delegations must be equipped with the necessary knowledge of science and law to make effective decisions. You raised an important issue about the system being too reactive, and I appreciated your solution that national controls can supplement international measures. We should use the flexibility within the conventions, as demonstrated in 2012 with methadone controls, to gather data before making decisions. Lastly, it’s vital that measures don’t restrict access to substances for medical and scientific purposes. Thank you again for these valuable insights.

Colombia (panel) Mr. Andrés López Velasco, independent international consultant on drug policies: As we gather to discuss the critical topic of legal, scientific, and regulatory challenges in scheduling substances, we face a complex landscape that demands our careful consideration and collaborative expertise. Indonesia places great importance on the three international drug control conventions that constitute the global commitments to addressing the world drug problem. Scheduling sits at the intersection of law, science, and public health policy, and we will explore the multifaceted challenges of classifying and regulating substances, from emerging synthetic compounds to evolving scientific understandings. Our discussion will address the hurdles we face in creating and maintaining a robust scheduling framework that incorporates public health and scientific advancements. We will examine critical issues, including harmonizing international standards, integrating cutting-edge research into regulatory frameworks, and financing research on controlled substances alongside legitimate scientific research. I look forward to engaging in productive dialogue and sharing insights that can help develop more effective approaches to substance scheduling. One of the main challenges we face is the collection of real-time scientific data to support the updating and classifying of new substances. Currently, when a new substance is tested and is found to be positive, it is classified, whether or not it has been included in the regulations. If the Ministry of Health has not regulated the substance, it will be considered for further regulation. The classification of substances in Indonesia’s regulatory framework is conducted on a substance-by-substance basis, which presents significant challenges when abuse involves an unscheduled compound, making legal intervention unfeasible. Enforcement agencies play an essential role in strengthening knowledge about new substances, particularly at the borders and through data analysis. There are several ways that law enforcement can contribute to improving our understanding of new substances. First, through investigation; second, by optimizing early warning systems. Indonesia’s National Police currently has an early warning system, but for now, its laboratory can only update the data. It is hoped that a new database will be created to improve the identification of substances, their origins, distribution patterns, and effects. This collaborative database, which could involve law enforcement agencies, customs, and health distribution agencies, would allow for real-time data sharing. By cooperating with forensic laboratories and utilizing data analytics technologies such as social network analysis, we can further improve tracking and early detection. Additionally, cross-border collaboration with international agencies such as Interpol or UNODC is essential for sharing information about new substances and tackling global drug threats. Indonesia is also strengthening its border management and law enforcement through regional initiatives and training programs, such as the one held in Southeast Asia this August, attended by participants from Vietnam, Thailand, and other countries. In conclusion, effective and adaptive international legal cooperation is indispensable to addressing the evolving global drug landscape. To this end, we must focus on sharing information about the regulation of illicit drugs, conducting real-time data exchange, and strengthening cooperation between law enforcement, forensic experts, and international agencies. Moreover, essential resources are needed to support scientific research in drug classification, including establishing research centers focused on toxicology, upgrading technology, and building capacity for forensic devices. Thank you very much.

Moderator: Any questions from the floor?

USA:  This question is for any of the panelists who wish to answer. As mentioned, the scheduling system was designed to address the diversion of pharmaceutical drugs. Many control measures, like import/export controls and statistics, aim to regulate legitimate actors to align global illicit drug production with legitimate needs. However, these controls may be less relevant when illicit drugs have no legitimate use. As noted, many recently controlled drugs and precursors are not widely traded. Still, we see a reduction in criminal activity after they’re controlled, though it may not be solely due to control measures. Are we entering an environment where scheduling serves more as a signal to criminal organizations to stop using certain substances, rather than for implementing control measures? And what does this mean for the Commission going forward?

Colombia (from the floor): The complexity of evaluating and scheduling substances often prevents timely responses to emerging health risks, particularly for vulnerable populations and public health systems. A question to the panelists: How can the scheduling process be made more responsive to the emergence of new substances, and what mechanisms can be implemented to ensure that scheduling decisions are based on scientific evidence and community needs?

INCB: Indeed, the process of developing and assessing substances involves common language to evaluate security and safety, particularly in terms of side effects. These are not unintended consequences of something designed for a good purpose, but rather may be side effects that arise through scheduling substances and discovering more. Inadvertently, this may incentivize criminal organizations to create more potent and dangerous drugs, particularly as potency increases, resulting in drugs that work at much smaller doses. For example, when discussing certain plants, the risk and potency can be seen at the microgram level, not just milligrams. These developments were not intentionally designed but may be consequences we must assess within the context of the scheduling system. Addressing the question from my colleague at the Colombian embassy, I believe we currently don’t have answers, but these questions should drive us to create an environment where we can thoughtfully address and perhaps revise the scheduling system.

Indonesia (panel) Mr. Agus Irianto, Police Inspector General, Deputy for Legal Affairs and Cooperation, National Narcotics Board: First, I will address the first question from the United States and Colombia regarding the scheduling process. To make it easier to explain, Indonesia, with its many islands, faces challenges. We have 70,500 islands, but only about 10,000 are populated. Nearly every day, we carry out seizures and arrests, bringing evidence to our labs for analysis. We have several labs across the country: one in Jakarta, one in East Java, one in North, and one in East Kalimantan. Each day, we receive evidence to be checked. We also cooperate with international organizations, including the UNODC, the DEA, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Australian Federal Police. Our collaboration has improved significantly, with our counterparts becoming an integral part of our organization. They have their offices in our facilities, and we train all border officials together. For example, we began training at the border with Malaysia in Aru and people from Jai, and we’ve expanded to borders with Papua New Guinea, including three major border points. We also deal with ocean borders, covering ten countries. We focus on scheduling through data collection at the borders, as most narcotics entering Indonesia come from other countries, such as the Middle East and cartels, like the Sinaloa cartel. In Bali, for instance, we don’t have cartels producing drugs, but there is a large Russian-speaking community using platforms like Telegram for drug transactions. Users can transfer money using cryptocurrency, and in just minutes, they receive coordinates for drug pick-up locations. Regarding scheduling, we have a system where the head of government is responsible for oversight. Scheduling decisions are based on the evidence found, and substances can be added to the regulation of the Minister of Health as needed, often within a month. That is the information I can share. Thank you.

UNODC: The scheduling of substances under the three international drug control conventions remains a cornerstone of the rules-based system, balancing scientific purposes with the prevention of abuse. Over the past decade, the number of substances in the schedules of the 1961 and 1971 conventions has increased by 35%, with additional substances added to the 1988 convention, more than doubling its count in just over 10 years. Currently, the UNODC’s Early Warning Advisory on Psychoactive Substances monitors 1,259 unique substances reported by 147 countries and territories worldwide. There is an ongoing need for multilateral discussions under the Commission to prioritize the most harmful and prevalent substances for international action. High-quality scientific data on the chemistry, pharmacology, and toxicology of substances is essential for effectively evaluating and recommending substances for scheduling. The UNODC has continued to develop best practice guidelines and manuals for the laboratory identification of controlled substances and has expanded its syllabi for training courses. Additionally, the UN’s International Collaborative Exercises program supports over 200 drug testing and toxicology laboratories in 19 countries annually. The Early Warning Advisory also provides valuable evidence for identifying the most harmful substances, helping to inform the prioritization of substances for action by the treaty bodies. The increase in the number of substances and precursors under international control presents challenges for implementation unless the necessary tools and guidelines are available and accessible. The UNODC’s Synthetic Drugs Toolkit offers a comprehensive set of over 500 multidisciplinary resources, tailored to experts, practitioners, and policymakers across health, law enforcement, forensics, and research. This resource has been accessed by 289,000 experts from 203 countries and territories. I encourage member states to fully utilize UNODC resources to address these challenges. Thank you. I also invite you to visit the UNODC laboratory if you haven’t already, where our colleagues are ready to assist with scientific affairs and the implementation of scheduling decisions.

Moderator: We are having technical difficulties with some of the speakers, so we are moving to WHO now.

WHO (panel) Mr. Deus Mubangizi, Director, Department of Health Product Policy and Standards:  Real-time scientific data must be enhanced to support the scientific assessments in the scheduling process of new substances. Thank you, distinguished panelists. It’s a pleasure to discuss this important topic of scheduling, and we’ve received valuable feedback both from the floor and from previous panelists on what we can do together to improve the scheduling process. It’s encouraging to hear that the fundamental principles we need—scientific evidence and an understanding of trafficking—are being highlighted. In some cases, substances are moved to more important schedules based on these factors. We need to consider these principles carefully and evolve them to improve the scheduling process. As we know, the WHO and the Expert Committee on Drug Dependence play key roles in this area, as outlined in the conventions, particularly the 1961 Single Convention and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Their primary purpose is to protect health and welfare while applying measures related to international reporting and the control of substances listed in the schedules. I was also glad to hear the discussion regarding the process in Indonesia and how substances are handled when surveillance indicates the presence of a new substance. The reporting and initiation of processes to address these substances is crucial for timely action. As we review substances and consider their potential risks—such as overdose, adverse events, and hospital admissions—it’s important to balance the need for access to controlled medicines while also minimizing harm. The decisions we make need to be evidence-based and focused on reducing consumption while ensuring appropriate availability. Despite our efforts, we continue to face public health challenges, including overdose deaths, hospital admissions, and the spread of bloodborne viruses. At the same time, there are inequities in access to controlled medicines. Addressing these dual challenges requires careful prioritization, based on evidence from countries and international agencies. To gather this evidence, we rely on reports from countries, international agencies, and focal points in 25 countries that do not have surveillance systems. The WHO also works with the UNODC, INCB, and other organizations to gather data. Our review process is guided by documents that outline the steps for evaluating substances for international control, including information from member state questionnaires and databases, such as those from UNODC. In our evaluations, we look for evidence of non-medical use, potential intoxication, and seizures or other control measures. We also consider how substances are formulated and administered. This process is evolving, especially in the case of new psychotropic substances. Real-time scientific data is crucial to inform timely decisions and recommendations. The opioid crisis has highlighted the need for real-time data collection and evidence gathering. This is especially critical for emerging substances. AI tools can be a valuable resource in surveillance, detecting trends, and analyzing data to inform scheduling decisions. We also need to modernize our tools to ensure they can detect emerging threats quickly. Countries like Canada are already using post-market drug evaluation methods to address safety and effectiveness. Similar approaches should be applied globally, and AI can play a key role in identifying trends, signals, and patterns in substance use and abuse. In conclusion, we must move forward with real-time detection tools and evolve our approach to data collection. By incorporating these tools, we can stay ahead of emerging challenges and respond more quickly to the dynamic environment of substance use and control. Thank you very much.

USA (from the floor): Thank you so much for giving me the floor. Unfortunately, our panelist is still experiencing connectivity challenges, but she dictated a statement that I would like to read on her behalf in response to the two earlier questions. Regarding the first question, this is more of a philosophical issue. The Commission should explore how it can use its authority to encourage countries to work together more transparently and collaboratively. For instance, on export and import controls, countries can engage bilaterally and provide notifications when treating substances. As for scheduling, when the Commission makes decisions, we effectively highlight the substance, which draws attention to its control. This contributes to substance regulation, even if it doesn’t always lead to more arrests or seizures. In response to the second question raised by Colombia, as addressed in our statement, we cannot reduce the weight we give to scientific evidence. We must wait for science to provide the necessary information to extend controls. However, we can consider more immediate measures, such as provisional scheduling or national measures, which offer more flexibility while we await the scientific evidence. Thank you.

IAHPC: I have a question after listening to the previous speakers. They mentioned that hundreds of new substances have been added to the schedule in recent years, and as noted, there is significant inequity in access to safe and rational use for medical purposes. We’ve all been aware of this issue in recent years. Given this, I was wondering if it would be possible to reorganize the schedules, especially for substances that are scheduled for medical use and are included in the WHO model list. Perhaps we could have a section for essential medicines and another for those with no medical use. This would help separate substances in a way that prevents confusion and reduces the stigma surrounding medicines that are needed for rational use. Just a thought I wanted to share after listening to the discussion.

WHO: I acknowledge the point about the ease of reference when it comes to reorganizing and renegotiating the treaty. However, we are reaching a critical point where some products are under international control, limiting access, even though we may not have the necessary privileges. Reorganizing the schedules could help highlight access to certain substances, focusing on those needs. The criteria for scheduling should not only consider medical use but also factors such as potential for abuse and harm, which influence where substances should be placed in the schedules. Medicines are classified into different schedules based on these considerations, and this allows for appropriate control measures. While reorganizing the schedules may not be the only solution, it could help clarify things and ensure transparency for everyone.

Chair: This was a great question, so I will open the floor for others to chime in as well.

Colombia: In terms of recognizing different medical practices, it’s important to acknowledge that essential medicines play a key role in developing policies, particularly in addressing global challenges and ensuring the availability of essential medicines. However, we must also recognize the diversity of medical practices, especially in countries with indigenous communities, where traditional medicines may be used safely but are not necessarily part of the essential medicines list. This raises potential conflicts when cultural differences are involved, and we must respect the rights and practices of indigenous populations. Thank you very much.

WHO: You have to base decisions solely on data; over the past 10 years, recommendations made to the Commission have resulted in at least 83 compounds being scheduled. So, how can member states help make your work more efficient, based on evidence? This is a crucial question because we need data—first and foremost, from your surveillance systems. This data should be timely and proactive, not just in response to requests. Sometimes we don’t even know when the data is available, so it’s essential that we receive it consistently. Secondly, establishing robust surveillance systems is vital. These systems cannot be limited to Geneva or Vienna; they need to be implemented at the national level, within health systems, forensic repositories, and import/export controls. The implementation of these systems must account for confidentiality, especially in cases involving criminal activity. However, confidentiality can be managed, and frameworks have already been developed to facilitate the exchange of information in a way that supports decision-making. We also need to collect data effectively. When we are presented with claims that are based on emotions rather than evidence, we cannot bring them to the expert committee. We need substance. This evidence will only come from your systems, your research institutions, and enforcement bodies. This will help us make faster, more robust decisions that are grounded in evidence. Finally, let’s not approach this with a one-sided perspective. We must consider both the benefits and the potential harms of substances. If there’s evidence of harm, don’t suppress it in your submissions. A full understanding of potential harms and legitimate uses allows us to recommend the most appropriate controls. Thank you so much.

Moderator: I noticed you did not mention money – you are very humble.

WHO: Ah, let me go to that point! I would like to express my appreciation to the member states that are supporting us in this work. However, it is not enough. Staffing in this area has been dramatically reduced, and while I rely on consultants, this is due to a lack of funding. Additionally, commissioning services, collecting data, and setting up databases all require significant financial resources. Therefore, it is crucial for member states to continue supporting us, enabling us to establish effective data collection systems that will provide the evidence needed in a timely manner. Thanks.

France: You mentioned AI as a necessity – has WHO or UNODC conducted some trials to identify new substances that replace tha ones already monitored and or do you have any recommendations?

WHO: UNODC is working on the area.

UNODC: We are excited for the progress and collaborations.

INCB (panel) Ms. Barbara Remberg, Senior Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer: Good morning, everyone, and thank you for introducing the precursor aspect. Before discussing the challenges, I would like to briefly recall why we face these challenges. Much of this has already been covered in the previous sessions and this morning, but essentially, over the past 10 to 15 years, we’ve seen an increase in the sophistication of illicit drug manufacturing operations. This has allowed for the use of more advanced manufacturing methods, which were once considered unusable in illicit settings. Previously, it was relatively clear which types of chemicals could serve as precursors. Now, with this sophistication, many new synthetic methods have emerged, allowing a wider range of chemicals to be used. This also includes what we call “designer precursors”—purpose-made chemicals created to circumvent controls, which often have no legitimate uses. These chemicals are typically very close chemical relatives, meaning many members of the same family can be used for illicit drug manufacture. The potential for more sophisticated illicit manufacturing has broadened the number of chemicals that could be used, and this number is virtually unlimited. This creates a vicious cycle where traffickers innovate faster than international controls can keep up. While we are focused on synthetic drugs, it’s important to remember that these technical advancements also have implications for the processing of other drugs, though the effects may be less pronounced. Here, common chemicals are used to increase process efficiency—such as solvents that can be reused, or non-scheduled chemicals used to standardize inputs and increase yield. The challenges to international scheduling of precursors are similar to those of end products, but they are even more complex. One shared issue is data collection. For precursors, we need evidence to support scheduling processes, including information on illicit use, manufacturing, and trade. Seizures often serve as a proxy for understanding this. Real-time data collection is crucial, and the precursor communication system of the INCB has been an invaluable tool, serving as an early warning system. In the future, we hope more countries will use the online system, which pre-notifies legitimate trade and exports of non-scheduled substances. However, data collection is often hindered by a lack of basic information, such as chemical identifiers or trade codes for customs, which complicates the collection process. Moreover, the system is built around individual substance assessments, and this substance-by-substance approach lags behind the speed of traffickers’ innovation. There are also administrative and legal challenges in the scheduling process, which is thorough but time-consuming. After a recommendation is made, it can take up to 180 days for countries to implement the decision, meaning the system is largely reactive. One of the specific challenges related to precursors is the diversity of substances involved. There are often multiple methods for manufacturing a single end product. For example, since we began focusing on fentanyl precursors, seven different fentanyl precursors have been scheduled. These methods represent all three major manufacturing processes. However, when we control one chemical, traffickers may move to the next precursor in the manufacturing process or use a precursor that is less controlled and more widely used for legitimate purposes. Designer precursors also pose a significant challenge. Traffickers can create any precursor as long as it is legitimate, and these substances may not be immediately identifiable as precursors. Additionally, fentanyl analogs continue to emerge on the market, making it difficult to prioritize which substances to control. The international precursor control system primarily focuses on monitoring illicit international trade. This system is sometimes seen more as a signal of trafficking patterns, particularly with designer precursors, but it is an important signal nonetheless. One practical challenge is that many of these opioid precursors are very potent and can be used in small quantities to produce large amounts of deadly doses. For example, just five kilos of a fentanyl precursor can be enough to produce thousands of lethal doses. Given these challenges, we must prioritize substances for scheduling, but we cannot scale everything. Over the past few years, the INCB has drawn attention to these issues, and there have been discussions and publications addressing how to tackle the proliferation of non-scheduled chemicals and designer precursors. For instance, the INCB has proposed scheduling two series of similar fentanyl precursors, taking proactive steps to control substances that could be used to manufacture illicit drugs. On the national level, we are seeing more countries implement generic or group scheduling for precursors. This allows countries to control related substances together, which helps streamline enforcement and prevent traffickers from exploiting gaps in controls. In conclusion, while we cannot control everything, international scheduling of priority substances remains a key component of global precursor control. The system provides a common legal framework for enforcement actions, such as seizures. But, as we’ve seen with designer precursors, we must complement scheduling with broader international cooperation, better data collection, and more proactive monitoring. Thank you.

Brazil: I have a comment regarding the classification of substances by groups. In Brazil, we have adopted this system, and we consider it an effective way to address the challenges we face. It has yielded positive results. Additionally, in response to the comments made yesterday by the distinguished delegate, I would like to clarify our approach. Before implementing a new group, such as a generic category for certain substances, we follow a consultation process. This allows us to assess whether there are any legitimate uses for these substances. We consult with chemical associations and industry representatives, who assist us in this process. If a substance is identified as fitting into a group but has legitimate uses, we have the flexibility to amend the legislation. In Brazil, the health agency responsible for regulation can adjust the regulations without needing to amend the law itself. This makes it easier to make changes, such as including exemptions for specific substances with legitimate uses. Thank you very much.

Moderator: Let me make a comment. Barbara, between scientists, let me pose a question for discussion on scaling precursors. We’ve often been restricted by focusing on substances individually, but I believe it’s important to move away from this approach and bring in a more proactive strategy. This reminds me of two things that we have yet to explore when it comes to the conventions. For example, when talking about the conventions and access to medicines, we often don’t get as much out of it as we should. It’s like buying a high-quality piece of equipment but failing to read the instruction manual. Last year, we demonstrated that we could achieve more with the conventions. So, the question is: How much further can we push based on our existing work? What other flexibilities can we leverage to create information that helps address the challenges we’ve discussed?

INCB: The approach taken previously focused on one particular group of substances, but there are certainly other groups we haven’t explored yet, like protective groups in chemistry, for example. I think we could define additional groups of substances. One key aspect that was highlighted by the board is the identification of substances with no legitimate use. This is crucial. The question is whether we can make better use of the knowledge that certain substances have no legitimate use. As you mentioned, many countries already follow this approach, and I think it’s a perfect strategy. In Brazil, we can simply consult associations to confirm that a substance has no legitimate use. At the international level, we would need that information from all countries, which underscores the need for cooperation. There’s also the aspect mentioned in the conference room paper regarding Article 12, Paragraph 13 of the conventions, which states that the commission should periodically review the adequacy of Tables 1 and 2. However, the commentary in the convention is vague. In practice, this could be an opportunity to gear this towards addressing current situations. Additionally, as Brazil pointed out, industry cooperation is essential. The industry is often the first to know how substances are being used. Even when discussing contract manufacturing, understanding the end use of a substance could make a huge difference. Notifying authorities about this could be a significant step forward, even if it’s voluntary. Some governments might even make it mandatory, though that would depend on local regulations. Lastly, I want to mention the ongoing work on a decentralized database for national controls on precursors, which could be a valuable resource. However, the usefulness of this database depends on the quality of the information we provide. It currently includes data on whether a substance is under control, but it also needs to reflect broader aspects like import/export restrictions, domestic controls, and even online advertisements. Thank you.

NGO (panel) Mr. Martin Jelsma, Transnational Institute, Netherlands: I want to thank the NGO committee for inviting distinguished delegates. It’s a real pleasure to share some thoughts on what, as many have already mentioned, is the heart of the entire drug control system. The scheduling system must function properly for the whole control system to be effective. To make it more effective, we need to look back at some of its weaker parts. In recent years, efforts have been focused on expediting scheduling procedures, especially for psychoactive substances. However, it can be risky to simply add floors to a building with shaky foundations. There are historical and systemic inconsistencies that have been raised multiple times, including by the ICP, which act as obstacles to consistent scheduling. These challenges have been serious, as evidenced by the performance of the IRG team in making consistent recommendations. Currently, the system is almost exclusively used to add substances to schedules, with little action taken on the few that could be removed. Fortunately, the basic principle is that a drug cannot be placed under international control unless the WHO recommends it. The WHO Expert Committee has been cautious in recommending the addition of substances with essential medical uses, such as in the case of certain traditional plants in Southeast Asia, where recommendations against scheduling were made to avoid negative consequences for access to medicines. However, we must remember that the foundations of this system, and its inconsistencies, have never been subject to a WHO scientific assessment. This raises questions about the evidence-based nature of the Single Convention. The system also established two distinct schedules for substances, which has created confusion in terms of how substances are categorized, such as why substances like cocaine are treated under different treaties.

The term “psychotropic substances,” created by the 1971 Convention, has no clear scientific basis. It was essentially invented to avoid subjecting psychoactive pharmaceuticals to the rigorous requirements of the 1961 Convention. There is no rational reason, for example, why substances like cocaine are scheduled under different treaties, or why cannabinoids, already controlled under the 1961 Convention, were included in the 1971 Convention. Most psychedelic substances were also scheduled without having passed the WHO assessment, and many of these substances were merely copied from U.S. legislation at the time. The 1971 Convention established a different scheduling procedure, which introduced new criteria for recommendations and decision-making, and allowed the Commission to diverge from WHO recommendations. This has been particularly confusing when it comes to how plants, precursors, and active compounds are controlled. The distinction between these categories is still not clear, especially in the context of convertible substances—those whose molecular structure can be transformed into scheduled drugs using solvents and chemical reagents. For example, the 1961 and 1971 Conventions treat narcotic drug precursors and psychotropic precursors differently, with the latter not being covered under the psychotropics convention at all. The term “precursor” has become more broadly used, blurring the lines between chemical substances used in the production process of narcotics and psychotropics. An example of this complexity is a stimulant listed in the WHO’s essential medicines as a precursor for methamphetamine, which is scheduled under the 1971 Convention. The failure to bring such substances under international control, like the raw materials for methamphetamine, illustrates the inconsistencies in the system. This situation is comparable to the coca leaf, which has been used for centuries in traditional practices but remains a controlled substance due to its potential to be converted into narcotics.

Overall, the scheduling system lacks a consistent rationale, which impacts its effective implementation. Several of these inconsistencies have been highlighted in the complicated review process, and they are central to discussions, such as the cocaine issue, that we are addressing today. In conclusion, reforming the scheduling system can help repair historical errors in the treaty system and restore respect for indigenous rights and cultures. The review process provides an excellent opportunity to address these systemic inconsistencies and ambiguities. I look forward to further discussion and questions. Thank you.

Mexico: The presentation on scheduling and the control of substances such as cocaine and the coca leaf highlights the need to distinguish between the coca leaf itself and its derivative, cocaine. This distinction is important, as the substances involved may differ in their effects and uses. Historically, this distinction was addressed in conventions from the 1930s and late 19th century, which ultimately led to the formation of the Single Convention. This process has been beneficial for guiding our decision-making on these matters. Thank you.

Moderator: Indeed, we will discuss the topic of coca-leaf in the afternoon.

EU: Thank you Chair, you just answered the question I was about to sask.

USA: I want to express my appreciation for the richness of today’s discussion. While it may have resulted in us going a little over time, I believe this interactive exchange has been incredibly valuable, and we have all greatly benefited from it. Mr. Jelsma, in your intervention, you mentioned several instances where the WHO has opted not to recommend control for substances that may be suitable for control but are essential in medicine. The WHO sometimes cites concerns about how the control of such substances under the conventions might affect their availability. However, as we know, ensuring the availability of controlled substances is a fundamental obligation of the conventions and of the INCB, which is mandated to ensure their availability. In our view, the possible impacts of scheduling a substance on its availability—and any negative consequences this may have—is an urgent issue that the commission should address. It should be a priority for us to study and resolve these concerns, with the support of the INCB. From our perspective, the approach you’ve implied risks absolving the commission of its responsibility to tackle this critical issue, while placing the burden on the WHO to make decisions based not on the criteria outlined in the conventions, but on real-world impacts. This could allow the commission to overlook these important issues. I would be interested in hearing your thoughts on this concern, and if you agree, how we can work together to address it. Thank you.

TNI: So the arguments suggest that those who create the regulations intend to ensure the availability of essential medicines. However, compliance with these rules at the national level is not always strictly enforced. Scheduling does not inherently mean restricted access to medicines, but in practice, the situation is quite different. As we know from reports, certain essential medicines, like killers, are very difficult to obtain. This issue is exacerbated by specific schedules that limit access to medical professionals only, with the possibility of criminal sanctions for those outside the approved groups handling the substances. This creates an environment where only emergency situations, such as wars or medical crises, allow for certain medicines to be used more freely. The fear is that such restrictions, particularly when applied too rigidly, can create barriers for medical personnel, even in situations of need. The reality today, due to the way treaty provisions are implemented at the national level, is that the scheduling of medicines does indeed affect their availability. This should be a concern, as the treaties themselves state that their purpose is to ensure access to medicines and alleviate suffering.

WHO: Grandfathering products refers to the regulation of substances that have been used worldwide, and how they react to current issues. Addressing the concept of grandfathering involves evaluating evidence that a product has a historical use, even if it is not supported by current data. This is how we would approach the issue. The second aspect is regarding weaknesses in access or lack of regulation. We are focused on empowering countries to strengthen their regulatory systems to ensure appropriate and responsible access to products, not only controlled drugs, but all substances. This approach aims to prevent harm and continue improving access. In terms of access, we are currently updating our roadmap for access to medicines for the period 2025 to 2030. It’s important to recognize that access cannot be attributed to one single element; there are many factors involved. We need to consider the entire process. Finally, regarding prescription and task shifting: many products beyond controlled drugs require a medical practitioner’s prescription. For example, with the rise of antimicrobial resistance, we emphasize that antibiotics should only be accessed through a valid prescription. However, we have also seen examples from my own country, where task shifting has been implemented—from physicians to registered nurses, for instance—while still maintaining appropriate control. There are many tools we can use to balance access and control. Thank you very much.

Moderator: Let me thank all the panelists for the valuable information you’ve provided. Your insights have been incredibly helpful. Matty made an excellent point about the scheduling system being a very effective control mechanism on the ground, which is absolutely true. Our colleague from UNCG and Link also clarified that this is a rule-based system, not a political one. When we look at scheduling, there are different categories in the schedules of the 1961 Convention, and we have a similar scenario in the 1988 Convention. The key is applying the right measures and avoiding overly emotional decisions. As the first panel mentioned, it is clear that, despite the ongoing shift in how we schedule medicines, the provisions in the conventions remain relevant. What also stands out is that scheduling should not result in scarcity or reduced access. We have numerous examples from various countries where scheduling has not led to decreased access, and there is much to learn from these experiences. At this point, as you’ve mentioned, both the INCB and WHO have highlighted that we cannot schedule everything, and for many reasons, including a lack of sufficient data. When we do schedule substances, we must ensure the decisions are implementable. It’s crucial to continue evaluating the evidence when making recommendations. The Commission and EU Member States have adhered to the principle of scheduling the most harmful, persistent, and prevalent substances, and we believe this is the right approach. A comment I made earlier is that the schedules continue to provide us with a valuable tool, offering substantial information to implement, although unfortunately, we are moving away from the traction model. If you visit the website of the Secretariat of the governing bodies, you will find copies of the conventions.

Chair: Thank you for the excellent moderation. The floor is now open for discussion.

Brazil: Brazil’s National Secretary for Drug Policies committed to advancing projects and promoting new initiatives focused on prevention and social reintegration within schools, communities, and families, in line with the guidelines recommended by the UN. I’m proud to report that this pledge is being implemented, and I would like to highlight three key ways this is being done. The first initiative is the launch of the “Career Program on Prevention and Citizenship,” aimed at preventing the use of alcohol and other drugs. The program introduces three prevention methodologies targeted at schools, families, and communities, supported by both national and international data. These three methodologies are: TiVos, for children aged 6 to 10; “Strong Families” for children aged 10 to 14; and “Together,” which focuses on children around 13 years old. The second initiative involves providing training for managers and trainers in prevention. A training program has been developed based on the European Prevention Curriculum, adapted to Brazil’s cultural and social context. This program offers evidence-based prevention guidelines in partnership with the Organization of American States. The third initiative is Brazil’s 2024 partnership with the UNODC to implement the Champs initiative and to develop strategies to eliminate violence against children and adolescents. Brazil is proud to be the first country to partner with UNODC on these two global projects, thus breaking down silos between drug prevention and violence elimination efforts.

Algeria: Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen, delegates, within the framework of the “Pledge for Action” initiative, launched during the high-level segment of the six different CN decisions, the Algerian Ambassador to Australia and Permanent Representative to the UN and international organizations in Vienna made a pledge on behalf of the Algerian government. This pledge is to establish drug addiction treatment centers equipped with advanced medical and psychological staff, as well as qualified services. I am pleased to announce that the first step in the creation of these centers has been completed, specifically in terms of their location. We have selected four cities: Bucha in northern Algeria, as well as cities in western, eastern, and southern Algeria. This will ensure that all regions of the country are covered. The Algerian Ministry of Health will gradually provide the necessary human and material resources to these centers, ensuring they become operational as soon as possible.

Iran: I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the distinguished panelists and the Chair of the Commission for their efforts in monitoring and addressing drug trafficking and drug abuse. Iran has established a robust structure for this purpose, which includes the National AntiNarcotics Act approved in 1988 and the Drug Control HQ, an interorganizational entity comprising 24 ministries, national institutions, and administrations. This body is presided over by the President of Iran. As a party to the three international drug control conventions, Iran has implemented national control measures for all drugs listed under the international control regime. Furthermore, Iran emphasizes the need for all countries to implement the regulations set forth by the three conventions. We strongly oppose any initiatives that aim to undermine international rules and regulations. We call on the international community to support the international control regime, a common legacy of humanity.

Thailand: In response to the ongoing challenges in durgcontrol, Thailand acknowledges the complexity of emerging substances and the necessity of sharing analytical data and collaborating with concerned agencies. The Thai Food and Drug Administration has taken practical steps to enhance detection capabilities and facilitate timely responses under public health regulations, including those substances controlled by international conventions. We appreciate the support of the UNODC in providing valuable tools and publications to member states. Thailand agrees that enhancing government accountability is crucial in the scheduling process of new substances. We also acknowledge the contributions of the UNODC laboratory and Scientific Services in assisting member states in these matters. Thailand reaffirms its commitment to the international conventions by adopting a comprehensive approach that ensures access to necessary treatment while rigorously curbing the non-medical use of controlled substances. We remain dedicated to advancing solutions that protect public health and align with international standards.

UK: The UK faced significant challenges in developing the Psychoactive Substances Act of 2016, which was introduced in response to the proliferation of psychoactive substances, often referred to as “legal highs” by users, many of which posed serious risks of harm. Under this Act, it is an offense to supply any psychoactive substance intended to cause a psychoactive effect, with certain exemptions such as alcohol and caffeine. While the Act has provided some protection, challenges remain in bringing harmful substances under stricter control. For example, inthe UK, we have detected 12 distinct chemicals in the illicit opioid markets. Many of these substances, when first identified, were not subject to the highest level of control despite their potency and forensic links to drug-related deaths. Earlier this year, we classified ten of these substances under the highest level of control, but new variants continue to emerge. In response, the UK’s independent advisory council on the misuse of drugs has developed a generic definition for these substances, which is being incorporated into legislation expected to come into force early next year. This new legislation aims to provide protection against emerging variants that have not yet been identified but could pose future risks. Creating such controls requires careful consideration to prevent criminals from circumventing laws by creating new, uncontrolled variants. This approach relies on the expertise of global scientists and lawmakers, who must collaborate to share data, insights, and understanding of emerging threats. We look forward to hearing about the scheduling challenges other partners are facing and sharing insights to address these global issues.

Japan: Discussions on these matters require a thoughtful and focused approach, with clear goals to address the challenges at hand. One example of this approach is Japan’s emphasis on regulating groups of chemicals essential for drug production. Concerns have been raised regarding substances frequently used in the manufacture of drugs, particularly in Japan. While this case does not constitute a formal recommendation, it highlights the need for informal decisions and appropriate actions to ensure proper regulation. We are committed to making the necessary changes to the schedule, recognizing the significant impact that the conventions have. Although the entry of new psychoactive substances may be slowing, substances such as cathinones continue to emerge and expand, requiring ongoing efforts to identify and schedule them promptly.

EU:The EU applauds the recent scheduling decision by the CND, which followed the INCB’s recommendation to add 60 types of amphetamine-related stimulants to the list of controlled substances. These substances, including precursors with no known legal use, mark a shift from a reactive to a proactive strategy. This decision anticipates new substances that could be used in the illicit manufacture of synthetic drugs, and the EU strongly supports this forward-looking approach.The EU also calls on the INCB to assess other potential related chemicals that could be used in illicit drug manufacture, with a view to future scheduling. Furthermore, we welcome developments that align with the EU’s commitment to enhancing international drug policy, particularly the adoption of a resolution on overdose prevention and harm reduction measures by the CND in March 2024. This resolution prioritizes human rights, public health, and harm reduction, recognizing the importance of prevention, treatment services, and the establishment of overdose prevention services within both national and international frameworks to mitigate the negative health and social consequences of drug use. The EU and its member states will continue to support the CND and look forward to working closely with international partners to improve the global drug situation.

Czechia: I would like to briefly address the distinguished delegates and civil society members. First, I want to express my gratitude to our panelists for their inspiring debate, which provides valuable insight into how to approach the regulation of substances with global potential. It is always a pleasure to address the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and share perspectives on advancing evidence-based addiction policies grounded in human rights and harm reduction principles. Despite the international drug conventions and their commitments, we believe it is crucial to explore new ways of addressing the emerging drug situation. We are particularly excited about the new law regulating psychoactive substances, passed this October, which follows a clear framework that assesses substances based on their actual risk profiles. This law emphasizes the importance of a regulatory approach that allows for nuanced policies, protecting public health while avoiding excessive criminalization. Regulation can help reduce the harmful impact of unregulated markets by classifying substances based on scientific evidence of harm, not political or social biases. Today, I would also like to focus on harm reduction. As we approach the anniversary of the 2016 Outcome Document, it is essential that we reaffirm our shared commitment to the well-being of societies worldwide. It is perplexing that harm reduction remains a controversial topic, despite clear evidence that it saves lives. We are convinced that now is the time to establish solid evidence and seek pragmatic solutions, placing harm reduction at the heart of national addiction policies. For many years, our policies have been guided by principles such as the decriminalization of drug use and a human-oriented approach. We firmly believe that these principles should apply to all substances, whether legal or illegal. Our experience and growing international evidence show that punitive approaches to drug use often fail to reduce harm and instead create barriers to healthcare access, perpetuate social stigma, and exacerbate inequalities. Drug use is fundamentally a health and social issue, not a criminal one. Decriminalizing drug use allows us to focus on prevention, education, and treatment, rather than punishment. However, much of our resources are still allocated to supply reduction efforts, with limited positive results in improving the global drug situation. Harm reduction remains central to our policies, from needle exchange programs to increasing access to treatment and care. We are committed to reducing harm in practical ways that protect individuals and communities. Evidence shows that harm reduction reduces overdose deaths, prevents the spread of infectious diseases, and promotes health and dignity. The upcoming anniversary provides a crucial opportunity to highlight harm reduction as a key tenet of international drug policy. We are committed to destigmatizing drug use and ensuring that individuals are treated with dignity and respect when accessing healthcare or social services. Stigma isolates people from their communities, limits access to care, and reinforces cycles of poverty and exclusion. We call upon all member states to integrate anti-stigmatization and harm reduction measures into their policies, ensuring that everyone has equitable access to support and resources without fear of criminalization or judgment. By decriminalizing personal use, focusing on harm reduction, combating stigmatization, and involving civil society, we can work towards a global framework that promotes health, justice, and human rights. We believe that effective regulation, grounded in the principles of harm reduction, is the way forward. This approach will ultimately prevent many of the negative consequences associated with drugs. To conclude, I would like to leave you with a question to reflect upon: If we can all agree on the importance of prevention, can we also elevate harm reduction to the same level of importance in our policies?

Australia:Australia is committed to amending relevant legislation to implement the C and D scheduling decisions and fulfill our obligations under international drug control conventions. In Australia, substances are proactively regulated based on evidence of potential harm, ensuring that medical, scientific, and industry applications are considered. The rapid emergence of new psychoactive substances, including analogs of existing substances, presents an ongoing challenge to regulatory systems due to the lag between detection and establishing appropriate controls. Australia’s robust drug analysis programs are critical to identifying newly synthesized drugs and substances that evade current domestic or international control. These programs use multiple data systems to assess emerging drugs at national and international levels. Examples include the Australian Federal Police’s enhanced national intelligence network, the Australian National Wastewater Analysis Program, and others. We continue to enhance forensic capabilities by investing in cutting-edge technologies and analytical techniques to ensure accurate identification of newly synthesized drug compounds. The AFP is in the process of procuring handheld devices for rapid, qualitative, and quantitative drug identification to support frontline efforts. These technologies also help identify emerging harms in the community. Collaboration and data sharing across health, law enforcement, and academic sectors are essential for timely and accurate information on emerging drugs and psychoactive substances.Australia will continue to contribute to the Annual Report questionnaire and the WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, both for substances already scheduled under international drug control conventions and those under review. We remain committed to collaborating with international partners to assess, communicate, and proactively respond to emerging drugs of concern.

Singapore: I will keep my remarks brief so we can proceed with the next part of the session. We have heard about the effectiveness and importance of the scheduling framework, and Singapore agrees with the C and D mandate in contributing to global health, security, and development through the prevention and control of illicit drugs. We believe the most critical function of the CND is to facilitate the scheduling of illicit drugs and their precursors under the three conventions. This process evaluates the potential harm and risk posed by substances through research and consultations with member states and scientific experts, such as those at WHO. It helps harmonize global approaches and promotes consistency in drug control policies, enhancing the effectiveness of international efforts to prevent drug use, reduce drug production, and mitigate associated health and social impacts. Singapore acknowledges the need to strengthen national capacities for scheduling dangerous substances. While the autonomy provided by the conventions has been exercised by many countries, Singapore enhanced our ability to mitigate the risks of harmful psychoactive substances by scheduling them based on their chemical structure back in 2013. However, we recognized a gap due to the rapid emergence of new variants, and in response, we introduced new legislation last year to target substances based on their capacity to produce psychoactive effects when consumed. In conclusion, Singapore agrees that a balance is necessary in scheduling dangerous substances. The scheduling process under the three drug conventions ensures legitimate access to controlled substances for medical and scientific purposes, while preventing their diversion for illicit use. This balance ensures that patients in need of essential medications continue to receive them, while also safeguarding against misuse of controlled substances.

Canada: Actually, many of the points we wanted to raise have already been eloquently addressed by the panel. To add, for Canada, we have taken a proactive approach to scheduling pre-emptive chemicals by scheduling groups of chemically related substances, including analogs and derivatives. This approach allows us to anticipate attempts by illegal drug producers to circumvent controls, and we have seen evidence of these substances being detected and seized within the scheduled groups. We also commend the ISB and the Commission’s decision earlier this year to adopt a class-based approach for scheduling. We believe this is an innovative step forward, reflecting the evolving challenges we face today, which are different from those at the time the conventions were established. We should leverage the flexibility available to us to innovate and stay ahead of the evolving market, ultimately saving lives.

Colombia: Mr. Chair, as we have heard today, our scheduling system struggles to keep pace with the rapidly evolving drug landscape. Its reactive nature causes delays in responding to new threats, while inconsistent national implementation creates gaps in control and coordination, hindering effective public health protection. We must modernize this system to be more transparent and responsive, ensuring it can quickly adapt to emerging challenges.

Dominican Republic: The government of the Dominican Republic has made significant progress in tackling drug trafficking. This year, authorities have seized 60,898 kilograms of drugs. We are also pleased to report an increase in cooperation with countries such as the United States, Caribbean nations, and international organizations like the CND, INTERPOL, and the OAS, all of which reflect the Dominican government’s commitment to combatting drug trafficking and contributing to the eradication of substance abuse.Our delegation also emphasizes the importance of participating in the global coalition for drug control. In line with this, we are proud to announce that we will continue to engage with Caribbean and European leaders in defining and coordinating mechanisms for effective drug control. In October, we participated in a meeting organized by the Latin American and Caribbean Programme, where we addressed the growing awareness of drug-related issues. The meeting highlighted the significance of supporting regional efforts to strengthen capacity-building and to implement prevention, treatment, and sanction strategies against organized crime involved in illicit drug trafficking.

Brazil: Brazil is committed to contributing to an evidence-based and comparative approach to scheduling as we collectively address the rapidly evolving global drug markets and the changing landscape of substance use. Brazil faces its own challenges, including the rise of synthetic drugs, the persistent presence of cocaine, and the public health impact of new substances. Recognizing these challenges, the National Health Surveillance Agency has implemented the generic scheduling system since 2016. This strategy allows us to control not only known substances but also emerging analogs and derivatives, helping us stay ahead of drug manufacturers who frequently modify chemical structures to circumvent existing regulations. One of the core issues in scheduling substances is achieving the right balance between regulatory control and scientific advancement. Brazil supports a science-based approach that accommodates research and clinical trials under controlled conditions. We recognize that outdated scheduling can hinder scientific progress and limit access to essential treatments. Beyond synthetic drugs, Brazil also supports research into the medical applications of controlled substances, such as cannabis derivatives, where there is growing scientific interest. However, it is essential that we approach this with high standards in clinical trials, regulatory oversight, and evidence-based guidelines to ensure that therapeutic applications are validated and introduced responsibly.

France:We would like to share the experience of our national scheduling team. We have an established system for data transmission, which includes annual surveys, such as those related to drug facilities, client services, and substance addiction. These surveys gather data from across the country, providing broad communication on the challenges related to generic scheduling and regulation.One of the key challenges we face is improving the dissemination of information, which is crucial for informed decision-making. Additionally, generic scheduling is becoming more subject to litigation, with companies increasingly challenging decisions. This is a significant issue we are addressing. Our primary focus is on improving the knowledge and understanding of generic scheduling. The second challenge is to define more precisely what “generic” means, as this is an area open to interpretation and legal disputes. Finally, we must be more aware of the potential for litigation, as companies may attempt to overturn decisions related to generic scheduling. These are the main challenges for our agency moving forward.

VNGOC, George Ochieng Odalo, SlumChild Foundation: Honorable members, as we confront the complex legal, scientific, and regulatory challenges in the scheduling of substances, we urge you to elevate the voices of youth and children, especially those in grassroots communities. The rapid shifts in substance availability and the rise of new, unregulated drugs are disproportionately affecting vulnerable young people in informal settlements, where access to resources and education on these issues is limited. Our youth bear witness to the devastating impacts of substance abuse within their communities, often with limited support and guidance. The lack of legal clarity and regulatory frameworks exacerbates the challenges in addressing these issues effectively. We call for evidence-based policies that reflect the realities on the ground, ensuring that scientific knowledge, local context, and young voices inform decisions on substance control. By involving grassroots perspectives, we can craft more responsive, preventive, and rehabilitative approaches that protect and empower our youth, providing them with healthier alternatives and a brighter future.

VNGOC: technical difficulties – link tba

Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC): the framework for implementing our program recognizes the significance of monitoring synthetic drugs and substances in the market. In this context, we emphasize the strategic importance of continuously strengthening control measures. In 2024, we provided technical assistance to update the national list of controlled narcotic drugs and substances. As a result, 69 substances were added to the national control list under Presidential Decree 635 of 2024. We are also currently assisting with updates to the list of controlled substances in collaboration with the United States, with further revisions planned for 2025.

Chair: Thank you all, see you in the afternoon.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *