2024 Thematic Discussions on the Implementation of All International Drug Policy Commitments, Following-up to the 2019 Ministerial Declaration

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Chair: Hello, good afternoon, everyone. Welcome back. Let’s begin the afternoon session.

Introductory remarks: Mr. Michael Osman, Social Affairs Officer, Border Management Branch, UNODC: I’ll provide a brief overview to leave more time for our interactive discussions with the panel and delegates. This morning, we discussed the rising drug supply, a pressing issue for the international community. Whether through increased cocaine production, methamphetamine supply, heroin from Afghanistan, or synthetic drugs like NPS, it’s clear that more drugs are reaching more markets globally. The manufacture of these substances heavily relies on precursor chemicals, such as acetic anhydride in heroin production, which is often diverted from legitimate industries for illicit purposes. As drug supply grows, so does the demand for these chemicals. These precursors and drugs are trafficked by sophisticated, adaptable multinational criminal organizations, often involved in multi-commodity trafficking (e.g., drugs, firearms, counterfeit products). With criminal profits estimated at $600 billion globally, these groups pose serious security risks. To address this international issue, our response must also be global. Sharing data on emerging threats, drug routes, and best practices—whether in legislation, law enforcement, or drug prevention—is essential. I look forward to our discussions. Mr. Chair, I return the floor to you

Chair: Thank you. I see no questions from the floor so we will begin with our expert panel.

Mexico (panel) Mr. CG Frigate Captain. Ali Barcelata Luna, Intelligence Section, Secretariat of the Navy of Mexico: Ladies and gentlemen, it is an honor to represent Mexico and the Mexican Navy in this important discussion on global challenges the international community faces in countering the trafficking of chemical substances. Confronting these threats is a common challenge that requires ongoing cooperation and effective information sharing between nations. It is essential that our joint fight against transnational organized crime be grounded in the principles of shared responsibility and respect for each country’s sovereignty, ensuring that cooperative mechanisms do not interfere with national policies. Mexico is committed to promoting structural and technological solutions aligned with public health and human security. We actively collaborate on vital platforms for secure information exchange, including online systems that facilitate communication on chemical precursors. This collaboration extends beyond information sharing; it involves coordinating operations and developing investigative methodologies. In Mexico’s case, the Navy has established the Intersectoral Mission of National Security Laboratories, bringing together experts in pharmacology and customs to ensure scientific oversight and traceability of chemical precursors. Mexico has also created the Interagency Commission for the Traceability of Chemical Substances to unify national efforts in tracking substances used illegally in production. Additionally, through programs like the Container Control Program at the port of Manzanillo on Mexico’s Pacific Coast, we have successfully intercepted shipments of chemical precursors and prevented their distribution to clandestine laboratories in remote areas. This collaboration enhances not only Mexico’s security but also strengthens international networks committed to this cause. Another crucial aspect is the protection of sensitive data during international exchanges. Maintaining cybersecurity in data access and information use is vital, as misuse could jeopardize ongoing investigations and the safety of agents involved in these operations. A comprehensive approach to cross-border exchanges—standardizing regulations and safeguarding confidential data—is key to effective international cooperation. Mexico’s experience demonstrates that through personnel training, technological use, and collaboration with national and international entities, we can improve the fight against chemical substance diversion and contribute to global security. Mexico is committed to these efforts and confident that through shared responsibility, we can make significant strides against transnational organized crime. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you for that excellent presentation. Several points stood out, particularly around shared responsibility and sovereignty, which are key. It’s also important that our efforts complement one another. Your emphasis on information exchange was well taken. Here in the Border Management Branch, we facilitate various information exchange meetings between law enforcement, prosecutors, and other experts to bridge the understanding gap on the challenges we face with these threats. Thank you again for your presentation. With that, I’ll open the floor to questions.

USA: Thank you for the opportunity to speak. I’d like to highlight a key initiative: the Global Coalition on Synthetic Drugs, established by the United States. This is not meant to compete with other initiatives but to complement them, with a specific focus on precursors. As synthetic drugs evolve, new challenges emerge, particularly in the diversion and design of precursor chemicals to create these substances. This shift is already transforming traditional notions of drug production and distribution, affecting both source and transit countries. Over time, this could blur the lines we currently draw between production, transit, and destination countries.

Chair: I think that is also a valid point that as technology changes and the ability to make types of drugs from precursors that weren’t perhaps possible to do a few years ago. So to legislation and the understanding of how that develops, at least to be developed. And I think yes, you can see a future where the plant based drug types are perhaps replaced by synthetic drugs made locally. So thank you very much for that point. Any final questions from the floor? If not, I will give the floor to our next expert.

Singapore (panel) Ms. Caroline Lim, Senior Assistant Commissioner and Director, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Division, Singapore Prison Services:  Distinguished panelists and esteemed delegates, thank you for allowing me to provide a brief overview of Singapore’s harm prevention approach as context for my response on our prison practices to prevent drug trafficking and support treatment of drug use disorders among inmates. Singapore’s comprehensive harm prevention approach is built on three pillars. The first is preventive drug education, the second is strict laws and robust enforcement, and the third is evidence-based rehabilitation and reintegration. Preventive Drug Education aims to educate communities on the dangers of drugs, strengthen youth resilience, and foster strong societal support for a drug-free Singapore. Strict Laws and Robust Enforcement serve as strong deterrents against drug trafficking, reducing the inflow of drugs into Singapore through coordinated enforcement by the Central Narcotics Bureau, border control officers, and police. This tough approach has been effective in controlling the drug problem and preventing major drug syndicates from establishing operations within Singapore. Evidence-Based Rehabilitation involves addressing the root causes of drug abuse, not just its symptoms. Our end goal is abstinence, aiming to reduce relapse rates by providing support from rehabilitation through to reintegration as drug-free members of society. Working with community partners, we build an ecosystem of support that addresses both drug abusers and their surrounding environment. In our prison system, Singapore employs multiple measures to deter, prevent, and detect drug use. First, our zero-tolerance stance and strict laws act as deterrents against bringing drugs into prison, and disciplinary action is taken against any inmate found involved in drug activities. Second, our prison infrastructure includes multiple security layers—from the complex entrance to individual units. All persons, including prison officers, contractors, and visitors, as well as all items, are thoroughly screened. Third, all inmates are searched upon admission and return from external activities, and regular security checks and random urine tests are conducted. Additionally, since 2019, the Singapore Prison Service has implemented electronic letters to reduce the risk of drug smuggling through physical mail. On drug treatment and rehabilitation, Singapore provides targeted, evidence-based treatment for drug abusers. Since 2019, legal reforms allow drug abusers who commit no other criminal offenses to avoid prosecution and maintain a clean criminal record. First-time, low-risk abusers are placed on non-custodial programs, while others enter a Drug Rehabilitation Centre, guided by research-based practices like the Risk-Need-Responsivity model and desistance research. This model tailors rehabilitation efforts based on individual risk factors, needs, and capacity for change, while desistance research emphasizes building social support systems, family relationships, and positive life goals. In the Rehab Center, drug abusers receive targeted programs, including motivational programs to boost change motivation, psychological programs to enhance understanding of the impact of addiction, and family programs to strengthen relationships that support long-term recovery. Family involvement in rehabilitation is essential, and we work with community partners to support families with financial aid, bursaries, and academic support for children. Stabilizing families helps abusers focus on their treatment goals. We also focus on employability, providing educational and vocational training, and offer community-based programs post-rehabilitation to aid reintegration, supported by officers, counselors, case managers, and career coaches. To sustain recovery, drug abusers are supervised under a drug supervision scheme by the Central Narcotics Bureau, with referrals to agencies for additional support, such as housing or financial aid. Last year, we established the Desistance Network, a community-based support network where individuals who have remained crime- and drug-free mentor current inmates and support them post-release. Recidivism is a key indicator of success in corrections, and we track the recidivism rate of each cohort of drug abusers released from rehab. Since 2015, our recidivism rates have declined and remain relatively low, with the latest rate at 27.7% for the 2021 release cohort—meaning that out of 10 offenders, approximately seven do not reoffend within two years of release. Thank you very much.

Japan:  have a related question, but first, I’d like to share something with Japan and the broader group regarding rehabilitation and improvement in prisons. Interaction on these topics is crucial. Japan has taken the initiative to establish a modern framework aimed at reducing reoffending, and ongoing negotiations are part of this effort. Many participants here are invited to contribute to these discussions in December, with the final formal development meeting scheduled for January. I look forward to collaborating with Singapore and other colleagues to finalize the strategy, allowing us to present this new model for reduction at the next CCPCJ meeting. Thank you very much.

Ukraine: In Ukraine, we’re also working on reforming our prison system to make it more humane. We’re aiming for a more liberal approach, with harm reduction programs as our guiding target. These aren’t fully implemented yet, but we are optimistic for the future. I’d like to ask about Singapore’s experience with implementing harm reduction programs in prisons, particularly regarding therapies for people with drug addiction, such as opioid agonist therapies. Could you share Singapore’s legal and practical experience with these newer, more liberal approaches to drug prevention?

Singapore (panel): As I mentioned earlier, Singapore’s approach focuses on harm prevention. We believe that drug abusers entering our drug rehabilitation sector can benefit from the treatment and various programs that help them build the human, social, and community capital needed to re-enter society drug-free. While we don’t implement harm reduction approaches, I can share more about the programs that seem to be effective. Research with drug abusers in our system shows that targeted, matched interventions—programs aligned with the severity of an individual’s drug use and risk of relapse after release—are helpful. Additionally, we address needs related to social reintegration. Many drug abusers have weakened or broken family ties due to their drug use. We’ve found that involving families and working to rebuild these connections are powerful motivators for change. Family support is often a strong motivator for recovery. Beyond family, building a community of support after release is crucial to prevent returning to drug-abusing social circles. To support this, we offer faith-based programs and a volunteer initiative, where volunteers establish relationships with inmates during incarceration and continue supporting them after release. This creates a pro-social network that provides support and encouragement. Work and education are also key factors. Our research shows that prolonged employment significantly reduces the likelihood of re-offending. But we recognize that the real test begins once an individual leaves prison, as access to drugs becomes far more prevalent outside. To address this, we provide a comprehensive support system involving reintegration officers, case managers, volunteers, and career coaches. It truly takes a community effort to support each individual and prevent relapse.

USA: When I initially raised my question, I was going to ask about release and reintegration processes, especially regarding community connections. You addressed that well, so I’d like to shift my question to the intake process instead. Could you discuss how individuals are screened for risk and the criteria for determining appropriate treatment levels, particularly how treatment is affected by the nature of their crimes?

Singapore (panel): When individuals are admitted, we use a screening tool developed in-house and calibrated to our local population to assess their risk of reoffending. Based on this assessment, individuals are classified as low, moderate, or high risk, and treatment is matched accordingly. Those assessed at high risk receive more intensive programming delivered by correctional rehabilitation specialists. The nature of the offense also guides treatment; we provide psychology-based correctional programs specifically tailored for drug offenders, as well as those involved in violent or sexual offenses. These programs aim not only to impart knowledge and skills but to give participants, especially drug offenders, tools to create personalized relapse prevention plans. More importantly, the programs allow individuals to explore the underlying causes of their behaviors and cycles of offending. As I mentioned earlier, we recognize that addressing root causes takes more than structured programs alone. Volunteers and community partners play crucial roles in supporting different types of programs, including creative arts.

Mexico: Regarding the research, were the measures you’ve described informed by input from the users themselves? How does the feedback from those who experience the programs influence the decisions made in the research?

Question from the floor: Is the treatment you mentioned voluntary, and does it also address mental health difficulties? If so, how do you incorporate trauma-informed approaches in your work?

Singapore: In the context of the drug abuse treatment program I mentioned earlier, individuals who enter the drug rehabilitation center come for treatment and rehabilitation. However, participation is always optional. If an inmate chooses not to participate, the prison officers engage with them to understand why. Often, the issue is a lack of motivation, and we have programs to help enhance their motivation and prepare them for the rehabilitation process. Research shows that there’s little value in placing someone in a program if they are not responsive or interested. While they can opt out, we continue to engage them and hope that over time, they will become more receptive.

Regarding your second question about mental health, this is a very important area for us. We provide 24/7 medical care, including psychiatric support services. Inmates have access to our correctional rehabilitation specialists, and they can request to speak with a psychologist whenever needed. An interesting initiative we’ve started in recent years is training fellow inmates to act as peer supporters. These trained peers provide mental first aid to those who need additional support. Since there is already trust and rapport between them, this program helps facilitate communication. These peer supporters contribute back to the community, offering support to their fellow inmates.

Question: What is the dropout rate for this program, and how do you handle individuals who, despite all the support and mechanisms in place, still drop out? How do you bring them back?

Singapore: The dropout rate is relatively low, and there are a couple of reasons for this. Inmates who go through the system often realize that these programs are designed to help them. They also hear from fellow inmates who have benefited from these programs, and some former offenders even return to share their experiences, explaining how the programs helped them stay away from crime and drugs. Additionally, as I mentioned earlier, it’s not just about what happens inside the prison; there’s also a community-based component. Inmates understand that in order to benefit from the community-based support, it’s best to participate in the programs while they’re in prison.

Russia:  I would like to thank the distinguished expert from Singapore for presenting the national approach, which we view as very comprehensive and solid. We also believe that it’s crucial to address the root causes of the problem, focusing on prevention rather than dealing with the consequences. Harm prevention is a cost-effective approach that can help avoid negative outcomes in terms of public safety and health-related consequences. I would like to ask you to elaborate on the outcomes of this approach in terms of the dynamics of drug abuse in your country. Do you measure these indicators, and what are the long-term trends?

Singapore: Thank you for that question. As I mentioned earlier, the main indicator we look at is recidivism, or, in the case of drug abusers, whether they relapse. For now, the recidivism rate for drug abusers has decreased, which is encouraging, but we know that for high-risk drug offenders, it remains a challenge to avoid returning to addiction. We are tracking this, especially in the long term, beyond the two-year recidivism rate. Research has shown that the two-year rate is strongly influenced by the programs offered in prison, as well as the community support available immediately after release. However, if we look at three to five years, the impact of programming tends to diminish, and reintegration becomes more important. How well the individual re-integrates into society and the community during this period is crucial. Additionally, we track how long they stay employed after release, as this is another important indicator. So, it’s not just about reducing reoffending, but also about supporting long-term desistance from crime and drug use, which requires ongoing support from the community. This is something we are continuing to work on with our community partners and the larger Singaporean society.

Ghana (panel) Mr. Joel Sekoh Abbeo, Head, Precursor Monitoring Department, Narcotics Control Commission: The drug trafficking issue in West Africa has raised significant concerns. In recent years, there has been an increase in the production of drugs such as methamphetamine, particularly in countries like Nigeria and Ghana. The region has become a hotspot for illicit trafficking, with production sites emerging in the south. This issue is compounded by the proximity of West Africa to major drug-producing countries in Latin America and the global drug markets in Europe and beyond. The raw materials needed for drug manufacturing are often sourced from chemicals that are legally used for legitimate industrial purposes but are diverted to illicit uses. The rise of synthetic drugs and nps has further fueled this issue. According to recent reports, chemicals such as precursors for synthetic drugs are increasingly being concealed within legitimate goods, exacerbating the production of drugs flooding the global market. The region’s seaports, airports, and land borders are critical points for tackling these threats. At the national and international levels, it is essential to have comprehensive regulatory measures in place to dismantle drug trafficking operations. Effective legislation and enforcement, including inspections and audits, are needed to curb the illicit production and distribution of drugs. In West Africa, governments should focus on controlling precursor chemicals and ensuring the regulation of equipment used for drug production. Given the transnational nature of the issue, regional cooperation is key. West African countries should continue to improve mechanisms for sharing intelligence and collaborating on enforcement efforts. Joint operations, including those aimed at dismantling cross-border trafficking networks, are essential. Organized crime syndicates are often highly organized, so collaboration with international bodies such as the UNODC is critical to combatting transnational organized crime in the ECOWAS region. Additionally, training border control agents, narcotics officers, and customs officials to identify and handle chemicals involved in drug production is crucial. Modern equipment, such as drones and other detection technologies, should be invested in to improve the capacity of customs and border control agencies. Collaboration with the private sector, including shipping companies and suppliers, is also vital for ensuring better control over the movement of illicit goods. Countries must harmonize their national regulations with international standards for controlling chemicals used in drug production. Monitoring and sharing data on the movement of these chemicals is essential for effective action. International authorities should also work together to enhance online platforms that facilitate the tracking of these chemicals. At the local level, efforts to prevent drug abuse and trafficking should focus on building community resilience to resist the influence of criminal organizations. Educating communities on the dangers of drugs and providing support to local law enforcement are key components of this strategy. In conclusion, addressing drug trafficking in West Africa requires a collaborative, multi-level approach. It demands sustained commitment from governments, international organizations, and the private sector. By improving national and regional regulatory frameworks, enhancing enforcement capacity, and fostering international cooperation, we can disrupt the illicit trade in chemicals and protect the security and well-being of our communities. We must work together to safeguard the people of West Africa and mitigate the global consequences of this illicit industry.

INCB: I would also like to express our appreciation for your effective use of the pen online and the PAYS system, something you mentioned earlier. We are aware that your efforts in objecting to certain shipments have successfully prevented the diversion of substances that could potentially be used illicitly. I have a question for you. I may not have heard you clearly due to connection issues, but when you mentioned controls on precursors, I believe you also referred to the control of equipment used in illicit drug manufacture. If I understood that correctly, could you kindly elaborate on the kinds of controls you have in place regarding such equipment in your country? This is something the INCB is focusing on, and my colleague, sitting behind me, is especially interested in the equipment aspect. This would be of tremendous interest to us. Thank you.

Ghana (panel): Control of equipment is addressed in our law. We are currently implementing measures to regulate it and are reaching out to international partners for direct assistance. We have contacted relevant parties within the country to identify gaps and address them. This is a controversial issue, especially when equipment arrives in parts, as it requires a very coordinated approach to manage effectively. However, the country has recognized the importance of this issue, and we have successfully included it in the new law we are now operating under.

Nigeria(?): I have a detailed question: When did you first identify this phenomenon, particularly regarding chemical precursors in West Africa? Additionally, have you identified any labs also in neighboring countries? As of now, Nigeria has recorded instances, but we have not had any reports from Ghana yet.

Netherlands (panel) Ms. L.B. Leonie Okhuijsen, Public Prosecutor:  Thank you for the opportunity to share information about the article in our Chemical Misuse Prevention Act, which aims to help combat the illicit production of synthetic drugs. It is important to highlight that the Act aligns with the UN and EU regulations, specifically Regulations 111/2005 and 273/2004. These regulations focus on preventing the misuse of precursors and chemicals in synthetic drug production by regulating the legal trade. Under these EU regulations, operators and users must have a license to possess or market substances listed as category one precursors. The process of categorizing precursors takes time, and only those that have been identified as being used in illicit drug production are placed on the lists. Since around 2010, criminals began using alternative precursors like BMK (benzyl methyl ketone) to produce synthetic drugs, as it became harder to obtain previously regulated precursors. This delay in regulation allowed criminals to find other unregulated chemicals for drug production. To address this issue, our new article in the Chemical Misuse Prevention Act aims to stay ahead of criminal activities. The article prohibits the import, export, transport, and possession of listed substances that meet the following criteria: 1. Used as a drug precursor – It does not have to be proven to have already been used as a drug precursor; it just needs to be likely used for drug production. 2. No legal use – The substance must not have a legitimate industrial use. Experts from the chemical industry and chemical distribution companies help determine whether a substance has a legal use. This collaboration has proven effective in quickly assessing substances. 3. Not scheduled by EU regulations – Substances regulated by EU laws for legal trade cannot be banned entirely. The goal is not to disrupt legitimate chemical industries but to prevent misuse. Since the implementation of this article on April 1, 2023, no seizures of listed substances have occurred. While this might suggest the law is effective, it is more likely that criminals are circumventing it by trafficking the chemicals through other countries where they are not yet regulated, thus avoiding detection in the Netherlands. Therefore, the effectiveness of this measure will depend on closer cooperation with neighboring countries and monitoring how the market for precursors evolves. Additionally, NITV has already listed several pre-precursors worldwide, and we are interested in seeing how this will affect the market and our future regulatory strategies.

France: Thank you. I would like to address the topic of the regulation of chemical precursors in France. In May 2024, the French National Medicines Safety Agency made an important decision to modify the list of substances classified as narcotics. This decision involved categorizing all related substances into a single global category. Until this change, only a few medicines were classified as narcotics in France, and other related substances circulated freely in the domestic market. This change is part of an ongoing effort to adapt regulations to the emerging challenges posed by synthetic drug production. As many of you are aware, this has been a sensitive issue discussed in past meetings, including last year’s discussions with INCB, where experts stressed the necessity of classifying precursors as a global family. This approach aims to address the continuous emergence of new synthetic drugs with chemical structures similar to those of substances already classified as narcotics, but which are often named differently. These include substances such as nNPS, which can be 100 to 1000 times stronger than morphine and 10 to 40 times stronger than fentanyl. In terms of trafficking trends, some regions have noted the presence of azotonitrosine, while others have seen an increase in the trafficking of azotoninosine and clonitrazene. This indicates that manufacturing locations are diverse, and shipments are often coming from multiple parts of the world. In France, a few seizures were made in the fall of 2023, and there were notable patterns of trafficking through the United Kingdom and via eco-friendly shipments. These shipments often contain small quantities of substances hidden in packages, such as toys or commercial items like game consoles and makeup foundations. When it comes to identifying these substances, tools like spectrometers and urine tests are not always fully effective in detecting new substances. In France, only two of the identified substances are currently classified as narcotics, even though they pose significant harm. When seizures are made, protective measures, including the use of naloxone, are employed to address potential exposure risks.

To manage the control of chemical precursors, France has implemented measures from two EU regulations adopted in 2004 and 2005, which regulate the trade of precursors between the EU and third countries. One of the primary methods is the classification of certain drug precursor products, subject to strict controls. However, this classification process is slow, and criminals often modify the chemical structures of substances to circumvent regulations. Since 2013, most drug precursor discoveries in France have involved unclassified substances, with investigations requiring lab analysis to detect these unregulated precursors. The customs services play a crucial role in this process, collecting samples, conducting investigations, and coordinating with the National Vigilance Center for further analysis. If a substance is identified as an unclassified drug precursor, customs may seize the commodities and continue the investigation. If it is determined that the substances are intended for synthetic drug production, further seizures are made. As of 2023, GBL was the most frequently seized precursor in France. The data for 2024 is still ongoing, but GBL remains essential in detecting domestic drug manufacturing labs. These regulatory measures are crucial in our ongoing fight against synthetic drug production in France.

USA: Thank you to the panelists from the Netherlands for sharing your experience with this new law. We’re always interested in hearing about innovative approaches to the scheduling and control of substances, and the approach you’ve adopted is very intriguing. We look forward to seeing the results over time. In the United States, we’ve been exploring similar concepts, particularly class-wide controls of substances. When we place a precursor under control, we also place all related substances and chemical groups under control simultaneously. One challenge we’ve faced in implementing and enforcing this is securing analytical standards, especially for novel substances. Additionally, keeping the libraries of handheld devices and instrument protection at ports of entry updated with the latest substances has been a significant hurdle. I’m wondering if you could speak to this challenge in your context, or if any of the other panelists can share insights on how they keep these systems updated to stay current with trends. Thank you.

Netherlands: I’ll answer your question, but I think it’s important to point out that we chose not to group chemical structures on our list. Instead, we focus on substances that have no legal use. The reason for this is that some precursors in a group might have legitimate uses, which is why we opted to list each precursor individually rather than by group. Detection of these precursors is always a challenge. Fortunately, in the Netherlands, we have a lot of expertise in this area, with forensic scientists and the police force well-equipped to detect precursors. As for how the process works to update scanners and detection equipment, I’m not sure, but I could look into that.

INCB (panel) Mr. Rajesh Srivastava, Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer: So, what I intended to talk about here are the current international challenges in precursor control, which have been noted from the INCB perspective. It’s both an advantage and a disadvantage to be almost at the very end of the panel discussion, as many of these challenges have already been addressed. But to set the context, what we see now is that illicit drug manufacture has become extremely complex. It resembles a well-oiled industrial enterprise, with very sophisticated equipment. Some of this equipment is custom-made, and manufacturers calculate inputs and outputs with great precision, just like a CEO trying to maximize efficiency. Specific chemicals are used to enhance the efficiency of production—for example, separating agents in methamphetamine manufacture to increase potency and reduce unusable forms. The degree of sophistication is high. Bulking agents are used to maximize profits. This is no longer the work of fly-by-night operators; these are organized, industrial-scale operations, and that’s one of the biggest challenges that law enforcement faces internationally.

Another challenge is the globalization of drug manufacturing. For instance, a particular method or setup used in North or Central America can be replicated in Europe, Africa, or Asia. These best practices are being shared globally, and traffickers are increasingly part of sophisticated international networks. As several speakers have already noted, one of the biggest challenges is the use of non-scheduled chemicals in drug manufacture. Under the 1988 Convention, substances in Tables I and II are controlled internationally. By December 3rd, we will have 36 substances and 15 esters added to the international control list. However, these aren’t the only chemicals traffickers are using. From the INCB side, we operate a limited international special surveillance list (ISSL) for chemicals that have been used in illicit drug manufacture for a long time. To provide context, since 2012, when the platform was set up, the communication statistics on precursor incidents show that half of the reports have been about substances in Table I and half about substances in the ISSL. However, if we look at the most recent data (from November 2023 to November 2024), we see a dramatic shift: only 250 communications about Table I substances compared to around 2,500 for ISSL substances. This shows that traffickers are increasingly turning to non-controlled substances to circumvent regulations, and the need for political action to address this is growing. Reports of seizures of non-controlled chemicals have come in from 70 countries worldwide, indicating that this issue is not localized—it’s global. It’s also becoming more challenging with the rise of designer precursors. These substances, which are often created specifically to circumvent controls, are sometimes only marginally different from controlled substances. For example, 15 esters of amphetamine and methamphetamine precursors were scheduled in 2024, and 22 of the 51 substances scheduled from 2014 onward are designer precursors.

Does scheduling these substances solve the problem? The evidence suggests that it does not. After substances are scheduled, they are often replaced by new compounds, as traffickers continuously adapt their methods. Between 2014 and 2016, we saw this pattern emerge, and the result was that the substances originally scheduled were replaced by others that weren’t yet controlled.

Another major challenge is that not all countries thoroughly investigate precursor seizures. For instance, when methamphetamine is seized, we should be asking where it came from and whether it was illicitly manufactured or derived from legal products like cold medicine. But unfortunately, such investigations are not consistently conducted, and forensic analysis is lacking. This creates a gap in the information necessary to combat this issue effectively. Operational exchanges are crucial to supporting governments in conducting these backtracking investigations to fill in these gaps. Lastly, another significant challenge is that the origin of many precursors has shifted. Previously, they were sourced internationally, but now they are often produced domestically. This change has made it even more difficult to track and control precursor chemicals.

Russian Federation: Thank you, Chair. And I also would like to thank INCB for the important work done in this area and also for the two-day presentation. We are aware that it is very difficult to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals, bearing in mind that designer precursors appear very quickly. This is what we get through all the presentations by the INCB criteria. In this regard, I would like to ask whether the last week in March on a big group of precursors, based on the principle of seeing their most helpful, has more data in terms of seizures of these precursors. I remember there was a lack of data or the level of cases, and this is one of the criteria of the 1988 convention letter board, which gives recommendations to the CND in terms of scheduling. The substance is frequently used in the manufacture of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance. In March, it was also discussed at the CND, as it was a concern that such data was missing with regard to most of the substances which were proposed for scheduling. Another question is whether new designer precursors of this group have appeared on the market. You mentioned that structure and sugars quickly change; one component of the chemical formula is changed and produces new precursors. Have you witnessed this with regard to those substances, scheduled and similar substances? Thank you.

INCB: Thank you for this question. Actually, part of it, or not of it, relates more to the panel on scheduling that is to take place tomorrow. So I would strongly encourage you to post this question again to the panelists who will be sitting in this year tomorrow. But I’m not trying to escape your question at all. To put the facts straight, the scheduling decision of CND this year is still to be effective. The substances will be brought into international control as of the 3rd of December, 2024. So it’s early right now to conclude with any significant changes. Yes, the CND decisions gets implemented 180 days after the notification is sent out. And that date is relevant: 3rd December. By that date, all countries are expected to have put in place control through the substances already. Some countries we already know have done that. In fact, notable cases are China, where we heard already, I think, effective September, the breach is under control. But obviously, not all countries in the world have done it. So it is still early to judge exactly what effect this would have in terms of seizures. As I said earlier, the designer precursors that were most often reported as seized last year are still being seized, and we don’t see that coming down, at least this year. But we have not also seen any new ones emerge, as you say. Again, it is still early. It’s only when the shift becomes very effective that we can start seeing the results. Please reserve these questions for tomorrow. Thank you.

Ukraine: When you were telling about these challenges, just my head, there was a kind of metaphor, a race we are confronting with these precursors and criminal groups’ sophisticated efforts to circumvent the authorities. We heard the authorities use some technological tools, digital tools, to confront this. I’d like to ask your opinion: at the current stage, who is more advantageous in this competition?

INCB (panel): It is always a cat and mouse game. Of course, the traffickers adopt new and new methods, but we also know that law enforcement is adopting new technologies a lot. As far as designer vehicles are concerned, I won’t name them, but I know that countries are already monitoring or scraping the internet to try and identify what’s next. If these groups of large numbers of chemicals have been scheduled, are the traffickers just waiting? So, countries have also begun to, in advance, monitor, use streaming technology, AI, or whatever to try and identify what the next possible step is. I don’t know at which point in time who is ahead, but the jury is always out on that. The fact that no seizures occur doesn’t necessarily reflect success. But certainly, we are aware of efforts internationally, from countries such as the one sitting here, and law enforcement, that we do praise. Some of the initiatives we have taken in the last few years have been aimed at helping countries with proactive measures. The industry initiative that we’ve talked about couldn’t speak about it more, but we’re building the capacity of judges and prosecutors. So, from the INCB side, it’s certainly an ongoing endeavor to support governments so that we are always ahead of the traffickers.

Mexico: The question was: What are the biggest challenges in coordinating with countries that have differing levels of regulatory control over chemical precursors?

NEtherlands (panel): Thank you, and that is an extremely important question. The first challenge we encounter is the fact that, let’s say, a chemical is controlled under the EU, and therefore it is seized under the EU, but the chemical has come from some other country, and that country does not control the chemical at all. The first challenge is conducting investigations because of the differences in regulations in different countries. This is a challenge that extends when we see pharmaceutical regulations come into play, because those are also controlled differently in various places. Another challenge we find, due to these differences in regulation, is that some countries require that to prove substances are being used for illicit trafficking, the intent must be established. There are differences regarding whether a declaration of a substance is enough to prove intent or not. These are some of the challenges we have encountered. What we’ve seen in those cases is that it’s not as if countries stop taking action completely if it’s not controlled in their jurisdiction. They ask for more information, more documentary evidence about shipping documents, etc. If those facts are available, perhaps in some countries, even the fact that it is not controlled is enough to initiate an investigation. Thank you for raising this very important issue.

VNGOC (panel) Ms. Dayana Vincent, Fourth Wave Foundation, India: Thank you, Mr. Chair. As a closing speaker on the panel, I would like to remind everyone that the discussions from yesterday and this morning point to the diversity of challenges we’ve been facing globally due to increased access to synthetic opioids and non-medical use of prescription drugs. Even mention of tranquilizers yesterday was really surprising. The morning panel mentioned that drug use has increased by 20% over the last decade. Civil societies working at the grassroots level understand that the impacted harms on new populations are far greater than what the actual data represents. The fact that women account for one in four people using drugs is alarming. These populations suffer from environmental degradation, contamination of water and soil. All of this creates long-term health risks for children and youth, who are particularly susceptible to chemical exposure. In India, where I work with the Fourth Wave Foundation, two major concerns are increasing easy access to synthetic opioids and emerging drugs, and the youth taking drug-related activities as a viable option. These two are really blaming us right now. Our community-based interventions work with young adults to protect them. However, it is crucial to have reliable data, which is very challenging to collect at the federal and national levels, requiring close collaboration and trust among stakeholders. Another issue is the legal trade fostering an environment for young individuals to engage in drug-related activities. This perpetuates the cycle of addiction and crime. The gender gap is narrowing, especially with prescription drugs. This evolving trend holds serious consequences for public health, especially in children. Some countries, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, have no access to social security measures, which makes this even harder to address. We work at the local level with self-governing bodies, like municipalities, to help people understand the importance of evidence-based interventions. We support these communities to be the first line of defense. The Fourth Wave Foundation is also the recipient of the 2014 ABC grant from UNODC, which has empowered us to reach over 9,000 students through our school programs. This is an example of how youth impact other youth. We also look forward to the new UNODC communication.

Turkiye: Drug trafficking continues to pose a significant threat to global and regional security, with increasing challenges in supply chains and the nexus between drug trafficking and other crimes, including terrorism. Effective international cooperation is more crucial than ever to strengthen the global drug control system. Turkey, as a regional training hub, has pledged to provide training and share experience through partnerships, particularly with the Directorate General of the Turkish Ministry of Trade and the UNODC’s Carbon Border Team (?) program in 2024. Turkey aims to support countries in controlling airports, land crossings, seaports, and other facilities through expert support, international training programs, and workshops. Additionally, Turkey is facilitating information exchange between countries regarding high-risk shipments and passengers and participating in international operations. As of November 2024, Turkey’s Ministry of Trade has engaged in several key meetings and activities: Experts participated in the six expert-level meetings within the Inter-regional Network of Customs Authorities and held joint meetings with EU customs experts in Brussels. April, experts attended the Ninth Annual Inter-regional Meeting of Customs Administrations in Ashgabat. Regional workshops on sanctions, embargoes, and national licensing systems were held in Turkey. Turkish officials hosted customs delegations from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in October. Turkey is committed to enhancing international cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking. Thank you.

China has pledged an additional $1 million annually to support drug control efforts in the Mekong Subregion. In collaboration with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and the UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, China has set up three working groups focused on prevention education, chemical control, and forensic analysis. In July, the first working group convened, focusing on drug prevention education. A study visit for youth representatives was co-organized by China and the UNODC. In the chemical control group, the UNODC office organized training on the user online system to strengthen international precursor control. The forensic analysis working group held a workshop in September in China, bringing together experts from the region to address emerging drug trends. China’s additional funding will support these initiatives and facilitate regional capacity-building. Thank you very much.

Ecuador‘s first pledge is to establish an analysis center to monitor controlled substances and strengthen surveillance of key drug trafficking routes, with a roadmap for 2021–2029 to generate intelligence on these routes. In partnership with the UNODC and the EU, Ecuador has held workshops to enhance chemical substance inspection capacities and is incorporating artificial intelligence to improve analysis of controlled substances. Additionally, Ecuador is working on a sustainable development strategy targeting urban groups involved in drug trafficking, which is set to be implemented by the Ministry of Public Health. Ecuador has already enrolled 309 educational institutions in a project aimed at preventing and reducing substance use risks. We encourage international partners to continue supporting capacity-building and enhancing control mechanisms. Thank you, Mr. President.

Canada:  The trafficking of precursor chemicals is a global challenge requiring a cooperative, multi-sector approach. Canada works closely with national and international stakeholders to prevent the diversion of chemicals into illegal drug production while safeguarding legitimate commercial and scientific activities. Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police operates a national program to detect and prevent precursor chemical diversion, relying on public-private partnerships. The government also collaborates with the UNODC and other international organizations to support initiatives aimed at preventing precursor trafficking, particularly in Central America, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. We are proud to support several UNODC initiatives, including the Synthetics Toolkit and the Airport Communication Program. Canada remains committed to global cooperation and information exchange in addressing the synthetic drug threat. Thank you.

Brazil:  Brazil remains fully committed to addressing the complex issues surrounding precursor chemicals and their diversion. The global growth in synthetic drug production, especially methamphetamines and synthetic opioids, is largely fueled by the illicit trafficking of precursor chemicals. Brazil, given its geographic proximity to major drug production regions, faces growing concerns about the diversion of chemicals, particularly for cocaine production. Brazil has implemented a national monitoring system to track suspicious actions and is working with international partners to address cross-border precursor flows. Through joint task forces and regional initiatives, Brazil supports the expansion of the UNODC’s pre-export notification system, which strengthens monitoring of unauthorized precursor shipments. Brazil is also considering a national mapping exercise to identify vulnerable sectors in the chemical industry and prevent diversion. Thank you.

Thailand recognizes the significant challenge posed by precursor chemical trafficking, particularly in Asia, and is working collaboratively with international partners to address this issue. Thailand’s efforts focus on improving real-time reporting and monitoring of precursor chemicals, with the support of the UNODC and other regional stakeholders. Thailand’s customs and law enforcement agencies have been instrumental in intercepting significant quantities of precursor chemicals, and the country is part of the China-led collaborative mechanism to address the problem in the sub-region. Since October 2023, Thailand has been utilizing a real-time communication platform for more effective monitoring and reporting. Thank you.

Lithuania: Lithuania expresses gratitude to the university for organizing this important discussion. The country highlights the significance of strengthening law enforcement and border control, particularly in combating illicit drug trafficking. Lithuania emphasizes the importance of implementing monitoring systems at sea ports and borders, improving information sharing networks, and working in joint operations with international agencies. Lithuania also addresses the issue of organized crime and the increasing volume of narcotics being smuggled by truck, with 65% of narcotic-related seizures being associated with truck trafficking. The country notes that cannabis, LSD, MDMA, amphetamines, and other narcotic substances are often found in shipments to Lithuania. Lithuania stresses that combating drug trafficking requires not only law enforcement but also a focus on addressing the root cause: the demand for drugs. The need for international cooperation is crucial, and Lithuania advocates for a comprehensive approach involving health, education, and social systems. Moreover, addressing financial crimes and strengthening international financial regulations are key to disrupting the trafficking networks. Lithuania reaffirms its commitment to continue working with the international community, improving national frameworks, border security, and law enforcement practices. The country advocates for a holistic approach and deeper international cooperation to effectively tackle drug trafficking.

Japan:We urge member states to actively engage in information sharing initiatives to enable a coordinated global response to the evolving tactics of transnational trafficking networks. Recently, the UNODC report in October highlighted transnational organized crime and cyber-enabled crimes in Southeast Asia, offering recommendations to address cyber-related crimes, including trafficking. We emphasize the importance of maritime route enforcement and suggest that a comprehensive platform is needed to tackle the trafficking of illicit substances, including the diversion of precursor chemicals. This includes strengthening development capabilities, defining robust legal frameworks, and fostering international cooperation. Only through comprehensive and coordinated efforts can we address these issues effectively.

Peru: Peru has faced significant challenges in controlling the trafficking of narcotic drugs and the internal diversion of precursor chemicals used in cocaine production. Authorities have focused on controlling chemicals like sulfuric acid, which is essential in processing coca leaves into cocaine. In response, Peru has implemented control systems, particularly in high-risk zones, and has enhanced monitoring of chemical imports and transfers. Joint operations by the Peruvian National Police and customs offices have successfully intercepted illegal precursors. Peru has also emphasized the importance of international cooperation, particularly with neighboring countries like Brazil, to combat precursor trafficking. Despite these efforts, precursor trafficking remains a challenge, and continuous adjustments in policy and law enforcement, as well as strengthened international cooperation, are crucial.

United States:We encourage countries to engage with platforms such as PEN Online, which facilitates communication on precursor chemicals that are prevalent locally but not internationally controlled. We also emphasize the importance of public-private partnerships, as the private sector can play a key role in preventing the abuse of digital platforms for illicit activities related to drug trafficking. The United States, in collaboration with the UNODC, is working to prevent the abuse of digital platforms for illicit activities and encourages countries to engage with international partners to strengthen efforts against synthetic opioids and prescription medication diversion. Cooperation on seizures, tracking trafficking routes, and early warning systems is essential to mitigate the distribution of synthetic drugs.

Iran:Iran has implemented measures to control precursor chemicals through a dedicated oversight committee, involving ministries such as the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the police force, and customs administration. The committee works to prevent the entry of illicit shipments and precursor diversions. Since 2018, Iran has registered several precursor seizure reports. Notably, in October 2023, Iran seized 12,500 liters of acetic acid. The country has cooperated with international partners, including the UNODC, offering training to law enforcement on precursor detection and seizure.

European Union: The European Union supports efforts to combat the trafficking of designer precursors, which are chemicals diverted for illicit drug production. We have worked to address the challenges posed by these chemicals, engaging with the private sector and online platforms to safeguard the supply chain. Designer precursors have been increasingly detected and seized in third countries, particularly by synthetic drug producers in the EU. We continue to support the INCB in its efforts to prevent the diversion of non-controlled chemicals and strengthen enforcement without imposing undue burdens on the legitimate industry.

South Africa: South Africa has seen an unprecedented increase in the production of methamphetamine. In February 2024, a South African Police Services team dismantled a large-scale laboratory manufacturing methamphetamine, uncovering nearly eight tons of chemicals, including basic precursors, solvents, and catalysts. The country’s Narcotics Enforcement Bureau has established a chemical monitoring program to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals, conducting hundreds of visits across the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors. South Africa has also launched a forensic research program to trace the origins of methamphetamine precursors and identify trends in the drug manufacturing industry. We continue to collaborate with international partners to strengthen our national frameworks and prevent the exportation of chemicals for illicit drug production.

Ecuador: Ecuador, a major transit country for drug trafficking, has faced significant challenges related to the trafficking of drugs and precursors. The Ecuadorian government has worked with the private sector to develop a new method of destruction for seized drugs, known as encapsulation. This method involves safely immobilizing drugs to prevent their release into the environment. Over the past three years, Ecuador has destroyed nearly 600 tons of drugs and precursors. In addition, we have strengthened our institutional capacities through training and the use of new technologies to improve monitoring and disposal of controlled substances. Ecuador recognizes the importance of creating new opportunities for young people, such as access to education and employment, as part of a comprehensive approach to combating drug trafficking.

China: China has implemented strict control measures for precursor chemicals and narcotic drugs. The government has taken proactive steps to prevent precursor chemicals from entering illegal channels, including improving legal protections, carrying out audits, and promoting industry self-discipline. China cooperates bilaterally with Southeast Asian countries, Mexico, and the European Union to strengthen drug control efforts. Through multilateral cooperation mechanisms, such as the US-China dialogue, we have worked together to combat the trafficking of drugs and precursor chemicals. China is committed to working closely with all parties to address these challenges and strengthen international cooperation.

Colombia: Colombia’s National Drug Policy seeks to establish strategic control over precursor chemicals and other substances related to drug production. For this reason, Colombia is working to update our control systems and strengthen detection capabilities, particularly in areas with a high presence of illicit crops. Colombia has made significant progress in dismantling large drug trafficking networks, which are the main drivers of violence and profits in the economy. Let me highlight some key figures: 740 tons of precursor chemicals were seized in Colombia, Over 99 tons of cocaine base were intercepted in laboratories, More than 5,000 production labs were dismantled. In addition, 101 individuals have been extradited for drug trafficking-related crimes to disrupt criminal organizations by targeting their finances. In total, our regional offices managed to seize over 4,000 assets tied to drug trafficking activities. It has been one year since the implementation of our new national drug policy. Despite the size of the challenge, we are committed to addressing the structural causes of drug trafficking while simultaneously dismantling the criminal networks involved.

Interpol: 

Interpol: International agencies have documented unprecedented levels of drug seizures, which reflect the expanding scale and diversity of producer chemical markets. To combat this dynamic, Interpol has launched a six-year global drug program called IRATE, focusing on intelligence, operational support, capacity building, and partnerships. IRATE leverages Interpol’s international capabilities, advanced policing tools, and expertise to help member countries cooperate and address complex criminal networks contributing to drug trafficking. One major initiative under this program is the Global Early Warning System, which monitors emerging drugs and trafficking methods. In 2023, we coordinated the first Fentanyl Impact Group with Canada, Mexico, and the United States to share intelligence, best practices, and strategies for countering fentanyl trafficking. Additionally, Interpol conducted its first global fentanyl survey, which will guide the development of operational support, analytical tools, and capacity-building programs for law enforcement globally. Operation collaboration through Interpol has already proven effective, as demonstrated by the Korean National Police Agency’s efforts to target synthetic drug trafficking networks in Southeast Asia. This operation led to record seizures and discoveries of new drug growth, including increased methamphetamine shipments from North America via Mexican cartels. Operations such as Fish Hurricane, funded by the UK Home Office, focused on drug trafficking networks across South America, Africa, and Europe. These efforts resulted in the seizure of over 615 tons of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals valued at $1.6 million, as well as 206 arrests. Key discoveries included 56 tons of cocaine and 52 tons of other drugs, as well as 280 firearms, explosives, and 65 stolen vehicles. Through such operations, Interpol not only disrupts drug trafficking but also targets the financial structures that sustain these networks. In this regard, we have worked with Italy to launch the Silver Notice program to target criminal assets, the first new notice to be issued by Interpol in 20 years. The pilot program will launch in January 2025, involving 53 countries with a goal to issue 500 Silver Notices in one year. These initiatives demonstrate Interpol’s commitment to helping member countries fulfill their obligations under the drug treaties and the 2019 Political Declaration.

UNODC: In response to the increase in drug seizures and precursor chemicals, a critical issue remains: the safe storage and final disposal of seized substances. Many countries face challenges due to a lack of suitable infrastructure and financial constraints. This makes the disposal of large quantities of chemicals, especially in remote locations, a serious challenge. The Scientific Services has provided valuable resources, including a guide for the disposal of chemicals used in drug manufacturing. We also launched a training and advisory program on safe disposal practices for chemicals in Latin America. In partnership with local authorities and the private sector, we have facilitated environmentally sound disposal in countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, and Ecuador, generating substantial cost savings for these governments. In addition, we have supported the safe disposal of chemicals in Colombia and Peru, working with private sector partners to ensure sustainability and cost-effectiveness.

Argentina: Argentina has worked closely with the University Regional Office on various initiatives, particularly focusing on the country’s new program against illicit chemicals. With technical assistance provided to the Ministry of Security, we have developed new codes and tools for enhancing the management of chemicals and improving communication between chemical operators and the National Registry of Chemical Proposals.

VNGOC, Ricardo Soberon Garrido, Drugs and Human Rights Research Centre: Good afternoon. I have been following the issue of drug production for the last 40 years, focusing on the production approach. On two occasions, I held an official position responsible for Peruvian policies, which allowed me to evaluate public policy matters stemming from international treaties, tracking the annual dynamics of illegal growth through UNLC reports and national observatories. Around 300,000 acres of coca are managed by peasants who coordinate with criminal organizations to convert the raw material into cocaine. In October, the classification of dependency on cocaine and the decriminalization of coca leaves was discussed. However, the argument that such decriminalization would increase drug production is a false one, reflecting a lack of understanding of the political economy of drugs. This misunderstanding ignores the very content of Bolivia’s requests in recent years. Despite similar policies in producing countries, coca cultivation and cocaine production have remained stable. It is concerning that neither national governments nor international cooperation address the structural problems of widespread rural poverty. They also overlook the limitations of small-scale family farming, which faces competition from monoculture crops like coffee, cocoa, and soy. Furthermore, the profits of organized crime, along with the artificial economic surcharges created by the illicit drug trade, make alternative development an economic fantasy or a fragile, short-term reality. The global cocaine economy remains largely unchanged due to persistent global demand. Each year, approximately 25,000 hectares of coca are eradicated, but such efforts are arbitrary, poorly consolidated, and often accompanied by human rights violations. Producers, often linked to illegal gold mining and other illicit activities, face permanent stigmatization, criminalization, and violence. Prices for cocaine are artificially inflated by mixing the final product with other substances to increase its volume, leading to the rapid replacement of the eradicated crops. As a result, producers simply move to new areas further into the Amazon, where they continue to cultivate coca, often in increasingly imperiled forest regions. Thank you.

VNGOC, Jiavern Tham, HAYAT: Ladies and gentlemen, the proliferation of transnational drug syndicates in Southeast Asia is one of the most pressing challenges the region faces today. These syndicates exploit vulnerable individuals, evading law enforcement while expanding their influence. Despite this, many Southeast Asian nations continue to rely on punitive measures—particularly the death penalty—rather than focusing on dismantling these criminal networks. This approach not only fails to address the root causes of drug trafficking but also violates fundamental human rights principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other related human rights treaties. The cases of Mary Jane Veloso in the Philippines and Kalwant Singh in Malaysia are poignant examples of this failure. Both were exploited by drug syndicates and coerced into trafficking. Veloso, a victim of human trafficking; and Singh, who was executed in 2022, represent how the death penalty punishes the exploited while leaving the true criminals untouched. Under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to life is protected, and the death penalty should only be applied in the “most serious crimes.” These cases highlight how Southeast Asia’s reliance on capital punishment is unjust and counterproductive to tackling the real perpetrators. It is crucial for us to address this via cooperation at all levels. The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) urges international collaboration, but the death penalty hinders this effort. Countries that have abolished capital punishment are often reluctant to share intelligence with those that enforce it, fearing that cooperation could lead to executions. This undermines the trust and cooperation needed to disrupt cross-border syndicates. For Southeast Asia to progress, we must adopt a rights-based approach—focusing on mutual legal assistance, rehabilitation, and building trust across borders. Another critical tool in combating drug syndicates is data collection. These organisations are highly adaptive, constantly shifting their trafficking routes and methods. Yet, the use of the death penalty obstructs intelligence gathering. Execution of drug mules and victims exploited by syndicates eliminates potential witnesses for syndicate operations. Fear of self-incrimination leading to a death sentence silences key informants and witnesses, driving operations further underground. If we instead invested in platforms like the UNODC’s Drug Monitoring Platform, we could enhance cross-border data sharing, enabling law enforcement to track and dismantle drug networks at their core. Lastly, capacity building and resource mobilisation are crucial. Criminal syndicates exploit weak enforcement frameworks, especially in resource-constrained countries. The UNTOC emphasises the need for capacity building, but many Southeast Asian nations lack the tools and training to effectively combat these syndicates. Rather than investing in punitive systems like the death penalty, resources should be directed toward improving forensic technology, border security, and law enforcement training. Rehabilitation and harm reduction programs must also be prioritised, offering alternatives to those vulnerable to exploitation by criminal networks. Mary Jane and Kalwant’s cases reveal the human cost of Southeast Asia’s reliance on the death penalty in addressing transnational drug crime. This approach violates international human rights obligations under the ICCPR and hinders cooperation, data collection, and capacity building efforts. To truly dismantle transnational drug syndicates, we must shift toward a more humane and effective approach—abolishing the death penalty and prioritising cooperation, intelligence sharing, and resource investment. Many lives have been lost to drug trafficking and the death penalty and yet, the drug trade thrives in Southeast Asia with ever greater profits. Adding to the body count will not stop the drug trade but serve to empower it. Ladies and gentlemen, the proliferation of transnational drug syndicates in Southeast Asia is one of the most pressing challenges the region faces today. These syndicates exploit vulnerable individuals, evading law enforcement while expanding their influence. Despite this, many Southeast Asian nations continue to rely on punitive measures—particularly the death penalty—rather than focusing on dismantling these criminal networks. This approach not only fails to address the root causes of drug trafficking but also violates fundamental human rights principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other related human
rights treaties. The cases of Mary Jane Veloso in the Philippines and Kalwant Singh in Malaysia are poignant examples of this failure. Both were exploited by drug syndicates and coerced into trafficking. Veloso, a victim of human trafficking; and Singh, who was executed in 2022, represent how the death penalty punishes the exploited while leaving the true criminals untouched. Under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to life is protected, and the death penalty should only be applied in the “most serious crimes.” These cases highlight how Southeast Asia’s reliance on capital punishment is unjust and counterproductive to tackling the real perpetrators. It is crucial for us to address this via cooperation at all levels. The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) urges international collaboration, but the death penalty hinders this effort. Countries that have abolished capital punishment are often reluctant to share intelligence with those that enforce it, fearing that cooperation could lead to executions. This undermines the trust and cooperation needed to disrupt cross-border syndicates. For Southeast Asia to progress, we must adopt a rights-based approach—focusing on mutual legal assistance, rehabilitation, and building trust across borders. Another critical tool in combating drug syndicates is data collection. These organisations are highly adaptive, constantly shifting their trafficking routes and methods. Yet, the use of the death penalty obstructs intelligence gathering. Execution of drug mules and victims exploited by syndicates eliminates potential witnesses for syndicate operations. Fear of self-incrimination leading to a death sentence silences key informants and witnesses, driving operations further underground. If we instead invested in platforms like the UNODC’s Drug Monitoring Platform, we could enhance cross-border data sharing, enabling law enforcement to track and dismantle drug networks at their core. Lastly, capacity building and resource mobilisation are crucial. Criminal syndicates exploit weak enforcement frameworks, especially in resource-constrained countries. The UNTOC emphasises the need for capacity building, but many Southeast Asian nations lack the tools and training to effectively combat these syndicates. Rather than investing in punitive systems like the death penalty, resources should be directed toward improving forensic technology, border security, and law enforcement training. Rehabilitation and harm reduction programs must also be prioritised, offering alternatives to those vulnerable to exploitation by criminal networks. Mary Jane and Kalwant’s cases reveal the human cost of Southeast Asia’s reliance on the death penalty in addressing transnational drug crime. This approach violates international human rights obligations under the ICCPR and hinders cooperation, data collection, and capacity building efforts. To truly dismantle transnational drug syndicates, we must shift toward a more humane and effective approach—abolishing the death penalty and prioritising cooperation, intelligence sharing, and resource investment. Many lives have been lost to drug trafficking and the death penalty and yet, the drug trade thrives in Southeast Asia with ever greater profits. Adding to the body count will not stop the drug trade but serve to empower it.

VNGOC, Sue Thau, CADCA: Thank you for the opportunity to present to this esteemed body on the topic of Illicit Trafficking in Substances and Precursors. I am Sue Thau, CADCA’s Public Policy Consultant. Although CADCA is known as a world-class substance use prevention organization, we have an abiding interest in the intersection of supply and demand reduction and recognize that both are essential to effectively deal with the world’s drug problems. According to one of our close partners, The Colombo Plan, unlike in past years, drugs are now cut with other drugs and adulterants along the entire supply chain by international drug cartels. Identifying exactly where the drugs are cut, and with what substances, both enhances law enforcement’s investigative capacity, while also alerting public health with timely warnings. The Colombo Plan, in a unique private/public sector partnership with U.S. Federal agencies and private sector forensic labs, collaborates to identify the composition of drugs at the source country, in transit, and at the consumer level to identify new lethal synthetic compounds, toxic adulterants, and novel drug mixtures that can contribute to overdose and/or chronic long-term health problems. For example, the Sentinel and NPS Discovery programs developed under this collaboration were the first to identify that drug cartels were adding the vet adulterant xylazine into the drug supply, in addition to identifying the emergence of the new vet drug medetomidine. Both adulterants combined with fentanyl cause a potent synergistic effect that significantly increases the chance of overdose. Discovery of the adulterants phenacetin and levamisole in the Latin American drug supply helped identify causes of kidney failure and depleted white blood cells compromising immune systems, respectively, in substance users, especially street children, a highly vulnerable and at-risk substance user sub-population. According to the Colombo Plan’s testing of drugs worldwide, there can be up to 15 different dangerous drugs and drug mixtures in illicit drugs, including other more powerful synthetic opioids than just fentanyl, as well as banned pharmaceuticals and other animal tranquilizers. In closing, illicit trafficking by international drug cartels has led to the proliferation of toxic adulterants being added to the illegal drug supply. This necessitates the ability for more timely and robust testing of illicit drugs at every point along the chain, from source country to final point of use, as well as to have more effective mechanisms and early warning systems so that law enforcement, public health, and demand reduction agencies around the globe can be alerted to what exactly is in the illicit drug supply and how it will affect issues such as treatment, overdoses, death, and other health or safety issues in their countries, regions, and internationally.

Chair: Thank you. This was our last statement today. See you tomorrow at 10 am.